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EXCUSING BY STATUTE THE MISSING
ELEMENTS OF TORTS OF EUGENIC
NONDISCLOSURE
Patrick D. Halligan*
How can there be an opinion at all about nothing? Reflect: when a man
has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something?
Plato**
The precepts of physicians and natural philosophers about generation
should also be studied by the parents themselves.
Aristotle***
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This paper concerns eugenic opportunity lost as a consequence of
nondisclosure of eugenic information. The two words which make that
topic narrower than the collection of wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims' are the words "eugenic" and "disclosure."
Isolation of the eugenic subset of wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims has implications for legal relations,2 standards,3 causation,4 and
damages.' Isolation of nondisclosure6 as a ground for action and its
separation from other behavior challenged in claims of wrongful life
and birth has implications for the same elements as well as the element
of breach.7 The thesis of this article is that all elements of negligence
are missing in wrongful life and wrongful birth complaints alleging
nondisclosure of eugenic information. The author will illustrate that
the resemblance of the elements of eugenic wrongful birth and wrong-
ful life to classical negligence elements is superficial. Despite case law
developments alleging uncareful therapy as a trespass and childbirth as
the consequence, complaints alleging a nondisclosure of eugenic infor-
mation as a wrong and alleging lost opportunity as the consequence are
thoroughly alien to the tort of negligence.
* Patrick D. Halligan is a private attorney with Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban and
Fuller in Chicago, Illinois. B.A. cum laude, Stanford University (1965); B.S., Stanford Uni-
versity (1966); J.D. University of Chicago (1968).
* Republic. Book V.
Politics, Book VIII, ch. 16.
1. See note 8 infra for a collection of recent opinions concerning wrongful life; see note 190
infra for recent opinions concerning wrongful birth.
2. See notes 10-15 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 16-32 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 75-82 infra.
5. See notes 45-46 and 198-230 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 37-45.
7. Id.
Eugenic Nondisclosure
PART ONE: EUGENIC WRONGFUL LIFE
Introduction
American law recognizes no tort actionable by an infant on account
of his unplanned birth. Although plaintiffs have advanced the tort
many times, the highest court of no jurisdiction in the United States has
ever created or initiated such a cause of action.' Though lower courts
in the State of New York have entertained the tort, the New York
Court of Appeals repudiated the tort in Becker v. Schwartz and Park v.
Chessin.9 The nearly universal rejection of the tort for wrongful life
should be strong authority for rejection of wrongful birth claims based
on lost opportunity to obtain eugenic, not therapeutic, abortion. This
article will first address the wrongful life tort by examining its elements
because of its importance in its own right and because it is a logical
premise to this article's later consideration of eugenic wrongful birth.
By definition, eugenic wrongful life alleges a negligent nondisclo-
sure to parents of certain eugenic epidemiological facts and claims a
cause of action in this nondisclosure. To analyze the existence of the
claim, one must return to the basic elements of a writ invoking the tort
of negligence. The plaintiff must plead the various components of
duty, breach, damages and causation. Under the heading of duty, the
relationship of the parties and the nature of standards of conduct will
be discussed. Under the heading of breach, the distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance and the element of consent to nondisclo-
sure by the victim will be considered. In discussing damages, the class-
ical components of a damages analysis, the interests protected and
limitations to the justiciability of damages will be analyzed. In discuss-
ing causation, cause in fact and the notion of proximate cause, not liter-
ally cause and effect but a second look at liability and damages, will be
analyzed. Close examination will demonstrate that these elements can-
not realistically be alleged by one claiming eugenic wrongful life and
will uncover the policy considerations that oppose creation of such a
tort.
8. A very exhaustive annotation at 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978 & Supp. 1981) collects the cases assert-
ing torts of wrongful life and wrongful birth. Wrongful life cases decided since the supple-
ment appeared are discussed in notes 155-168 infra. Nearly all wrongful life claims are
joined with wrongful birth claims made by parents. The exceptions are Curlender v. Bio-
Science Labs, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) and Turpin v. Sortini, 119
Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (198 I)petition for hearing granted, No. S.F. 24319 (Aug.
6, 1981) (argued Nov. 30, 1981).
For a collection of early American and foreign cases, see Robertson, Civil Liability.Arising
From "Wrongful Birth" Following An Unsuccessfl Sterilization Operation, 4 Am. J.L. &
Med. 131, 133 n.3 (1978).
Except for Turpin and Anderson, the infants' wrongful life claims were joined with par-
ents' wrongful birth claims.
For a list of early United States cases and foreign cases, see Robertson, Civil Liability
Arisingfrom "Wrongful Birth " Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. 1. L.
& MED. 131, 133, n.3 (1978).




The Relationship Between a Physician and the Unborn Child of an
Obstetrical Patient: A Middle Ground
In a swift change from earlier doctrine, the prevailing American law
allows an infant to sue a physician for injuries the infant has sustained
before his birth.'" This line of cases shows that the relationship be-
tween a physician and an unborn child is sensitive and important, in-
eluctably influencing the relationship between the physician and
obstetrical patient. In that obstetricians care for the unborn child in
various respects," the relationship between the physician and unborn
child is a relationship suigeners. The New York case of Shack v. Hol-
land 2 recognized this relationship in the context of a disclosure dis-
pute. The case held that a physician has an obligation to explain
alternate methods of delivery and the risks for the mother and child.
The opinion ruled that the baby may sue for selection of a more risky
delivery method if the risk materializes. The case implied that the phy-
sician must encourage the mother to balance her own interests with
those of the infant and suggested that when practicable the physician
himself must balance the interests of both patients. The balancing ex-
tends to the matter of giving and withholding information as well as to
matters of manual skill. The three-way relationship is almost unavoid-
able as a matter of legal policy. The New York Court of Appeals held
in Becker v. Schwartz ' that even an express contract between the par-
ents and the physician could not completely preoccupy the parties with
only the interests of the parents. In that case, the parents specifically
contracted with a physician for genetic counselling. The physician
gave erroneous advice and the parents were presented with a sick child.
The court dismissed the wrongful life count on behalf of the child, im-
plying that even an express contract will not substitute for the infant's
consent to his destruction. The implication relevant here is that the
relationship is unavoidably tripartite.
The relationships of the parties are a necessary part of the determi-
nation of obligations, policies for limiting liability, and interests pro-
tected by the tort of negligence.' 4 In dealing with the unique
relationship among three persons, several positions are possible. There
are two extreme positions. One states that a physician has no duty to
10. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, 335-38 (4th ed., 1971).
II. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 444, 404 A.2d 8, 20 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
12. 89 Misc.2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1976).
13. Becker. 46 N.Y.2d at 419-22, 386 N.E.2d at 817-19, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 905-07. (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
14. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 324-26.
An illustration of the importance of relationship analysis for ascertainment of liability of
physicians and other persons for eugenic nondisclosure is the new conception that a relation-
ship exists between an unborn child and the mother's obstetrician which accompanied devel-




disclose information to parents even when the parents ask for informa-
tion. The New York Court of Appeals in Becker v. Schwartz 5 tended
toward this extreme. The opposite extreme proposes that the law im-
pose upon physicians a duty of affirmative action to initiate discussion
of eugenic epidemiological data. This extreme, advocated by plaintiffs
in eugenic wrongful life cases, implies that physicians have the obliga-
tion to ask patients about their racial and ethnic background and to
initiate discussions about diseases which have a predilection for per-
sons of that race whether or not the patient asks for such information.
In some circumstances this extreme proposal would force a physician to
irritate, insult, or humiliate a patient. Between these two extremes, the
author proposes a middle course.
The middle ground is this: when a patient asks a physician for in-
formation, the law should oblige him to do one of two things. The
physician may give full and complete information to the patient. As an
alternative, the physician may tell the patient that such information ex-
ists and state some other source where the patient may obtain the infor-
mation if the physician does not wish to discuss the matter. This
middle ground avoids both extremes, gives some weight to the interests
of the unborn fetus, and avoids the tendency toward acrimony. By
placing some obligations on physicians, it honors the rights of privacy,
self-determination and reproductive choice of parents and gives consid-
eration to the unique relationship of the parties by balancing their in-
terests. If the plaintiff's extreme view of duty were undertaken, the
courts and the medical profession would have to formulate problematic
standards of disclosure which shall now be discussed.
Standards of Disclosure
Privilege of Conscience. Exponents of a tort of eugenic wrongful life
wish to regulate physicians' exercise of speech, not manual skill or care
of patients. Speech is not a typical subject for regulation by the tort of
negligence. For a variety of reasons, many persons and physicians pre-
fer not to undertake or initiate discussions on eugenics or eugenic abor-
tions. The courts should recognize an unqualified privilege for the
physician to refrain from giving information even where the patient
specifically asks for information and, afortiori, where the patient does
not bring up the subject. When the end to obtaining information is
abortion, the consent clauses 6 in abortion statutes are some authority
15. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 405-07. 386 N.E.2d at 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
16. As early as Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179. 198 (1973). the companion to Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S.
113 (1973), the Supreme Court sustained a conscience clause allowing any hospital to refuse
to admit a patient for abortion. But lower courts did not apply the rule to hospitals receiving
Hill-Burton Act money. In response to one such case, Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F.
Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), which had mandatorily enjoined a hospital to receive a patient
for sterilization surgery, Congress passed a conscience clause popularly known as the Church
Amendment to the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973. Pub. L. 93-45, § 401(b)-(d). 87
Stat. 95 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1976)). Submitted, the abortion funding cases, supra
note 145, in any event undercut rulings like Taylor.
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for a privilege to remain silent. Such clauses do not specifically create
an informational privilege, but a fair construction would support exist-
ence of the privilege. Plaintiffs say that the solution is not the creation
of a categorical privilege, but a privilege in physicians who declare an
objection to abortion, eugenic abortion, or eugenic counselling. This
suggestion would be unwholesome. First, it creates a defense based on
purely subjective states of mind of particular practitioners. Second, it
would create a temptation toward perjury by the defendant. Third, the
privilege would be complicated and litigious.
The alternative to the privilege asserted is formulation of standards.
For instance, a majority of physicians practicing in a locale could dic-
tate what matters a physician will or will not suggest to his patient even
though such matters are subject to great ethical controversy. Yet, indi-
vidual conscience and freedom are opposed to formulation of such
standards where the sources of the standards are unclear.
The Sources and Nature of Standards. The practical effect of creat-
ing an obligation to discuss eugenic counselling and abortion is this: a
rough majority of ordinarily competent obstetricians in one area will
decide what standards, in this case what non-medical ethical values,
other obstetricians must adhere to if they wish to continue to practice
obstetrics. The physician not only would have to conform his treat-
ment to group norms, he would also have to adjust his speech and his
thoughts on eugenic issues to majority opinions of his profession. This
follows from the procedure used to determine negligence standards in a
new tort modeled on negligent action of a trade group. The court sys-
tem delegates to the trade group much power in formulating its own
law or policy. When the matters concern technical regulation of man-
ual proficiency and the like, this delegation is not unwholesome if the
trade group is well conducted and maintains a high level of skill and
education. Where the matters exceed mere manual skill, the delegation
invades the province of the legislature. The courts should not allow
such a delegation. The trade group or profession may not be capable
of the creation, formulation, and promulgation of proper nontechnical
standards. 7 To illustrate the results of delegation, a discussion of the
extreme positions mentioned above is appropriate. In accord with the
position advocating no duty to disclose, physicians in a locale could
develop the practice of not answering questions or referring patients. If
the unqualified duty standard is adopted, physicians might react by a
"defensive medicine" mentality as they have reacted to other aspects of
the burgeoning area of medical malpractice litigation. Physicians
could heighten public consciousness and fear of the most remote pos-
17. Judge Learned Hand adverted to this possibility in a famous case. E. Trans. Co. v. N. Badge
Co. (The T.J. Hooper). 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662. PROSSER, supra
note 10. at 167. has also adverted to the unfavorable results which can occur with delegation
to a trade group.
[Vol. 9:52
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sibilities of eugenic disease and suggest abortion of great numbers on
remote bases for fear that their patients will criticize them for nondis-
closure of such information.' 8 Advocates of eugenics would not accept
this result either. The courts should not enlarge the tort of neglience to
produce a power to legislate within the medical community when legis-
latures have indicated intense interest in regulating abortion and where
formulation of standards is a difficult legislative matter.
Nonjusiciabiitv of Standards. The nonjusticiability of disputed
ethical and political controversies surrounding eugenics ought to be ap-
parent to the courts. Later portions of this article will show the genuine
debate and the uncertainties surrounding eugenic test reliability, test
indications, and epidemiological matters.' 9 Given subtleties and con-
tradictions of this nature, determination of disclosure standards is a
matter "so bitterly contested as to be, for the moment, incapable of
resolution" by a court of law.2" The values of judicial self-restraint,
judicial respect for the prerogatives of the legislature, and principles of
representative government dictate that creation of novel torts should be
left to the legislature.2' Standards of disclosure of eugenic information
present a political question in the larger sense. These matters are for
political departments of government. The classic role of the courts is to
implement legislative policies. Evenjudicial activists claim a privilege
to exercise legislative authority only when the legislature is inert for
long periods of time. The resultant policies must be within the compe-
tence of the courts to devise as extensions of prior settled policies in the
jurisdiction. Cardozo, following Holmes and others, referred to such
activity as interstitial and incremental policymaking over small gaps in
otherwise settled doctrine. 2 Senator Moynihan recently formulated
the limitation on courts' activity. He suggests that if the courts under-
take policy formulation, their ability to perform classic functions of
policy implementation, settlement and contract stabilization and decree
enforcement will diminish. In his words, if the courts would help to
keep the king's peace, they best not formulate the king's wars." If the
courts themselves should decline to promulgate new standards of eu-
genic disclosure, it is less sensible to delegate the matter to the medical
community where that community may overreact in various ways in
absence of an ethical consensus.
Judicial Gradation of Worth of Lives. If courts are to entertain
claims for wrongful life of an imperfect citizen, then by what standards
18. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 422, 386 N.E.2d at 818-19, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 907 (Wachtler. J., dissenting
in part).
19. See notes 180-190 infra and accompanying text.
20. Finklestein. Judicial Self-Limitafion, 37 HARV. L. REv. 338, 344-45 (1924).
21. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01.
22. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15, 128-29 (1921).
23. Moynihan, The Courts and Social Science, 54 PUBLIC INTEREST 12. 17 (1979).
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are courts to define imperfections which make birth wrongful and
make failure to mention their possibility wrongful? 24 Plaintiffs suggest
that courts grade qualities of living and create duties of affirmative ac-
tion by physicians to counsel abortion of some very low quality fetuses.
This concept is gruesome to many, is likely to consume judicial re-
sources in drawing capricious cutoffs, and proves too much.
If obstetricians must suggest non-conception or abortion of low
quality fetuses, the logical sequitur imposes an obligation to foster the
begetting of not-so-low quality lives that exceed some judicially in-
vented standard of minimum positive value. It is no more unreal for a
"worthwhile" life to sue an obstetrician for nonexistence than for an ill
infant to sue on the hypothesis that nonexistence would be better than
life. The companion parental tort would be a suit by a eugenically su-
perior couple with given fertility for failure of a physician to suggest
fertility-enhancing drugs. If this implication seems alarmist, the reader
must reflect upon the similarity of proposed duties to avoid very low
quality, life and proposed duties to foster production of lives worth
more. 
5
Authors like Glover and Bayles concede that they are not willing to
grade qualities of life. They argue that gradation requires evaluation
of many factors; happiness in the ordinary sense is not determinative.
They expressly state that such gradation is a legislative task of balanc-
ing group interests.26 While not theoretically rejecting obligations to
avoid existence of some infants, they reject basing such obligations on
rules designed to proscribe infliction of harm on an individual because
nobody can posit that existence affects one at all, much less that it
harms him. 27 Judges and ethicians define harm comparatively as mak-
ing the victim "worse off.'' 28 Defining harm as giving personhood
problematically differs from positing an existing person's right to im-
plement a preference for death. The existing person has an actual con-
stitutional substratum and an actual life history making choice and
comparison real.2' A claim that one would rather not exist or achieve
legal personhood hypothesizes a situation before birth which annihi-
lates any possibility of preference at any time. 30 The only solution is to
assign a value to nonexistence by fiat. This is a legislative function.
Even if nonexistence be so valued, the practical measurement problem
persists. If nonexistence be valued as neutral or ambivalent existence,
it is problematic in the extreme to measure what life is worse than am-
bivalent life.3 Without attempting definition, Glover and Bayles con-
24. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (1978).
25. J. GLOVER. CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIvEs 66-67. 70-71 (1973) Bayles, Harm to the
Unconceir'ed. 5 PHILOSOPHY & Puu. AFF. 292. 294, 298-300.
26. J. GLOVER, supra note 25. at 50-59. 70-7 1: Bayles. supra note 25, at 301-04.
27. J. GLOVER. supra note 25, at 66-69.
28. Bayles. supra note 25. at 293.
29. Englehardt, The Ontologi' ofAbortion. 84 ETHics 217 (1974).
30. Bayles, supra note 25. at 295.
31. Id at 295; J. GLOVER, supra note 25, at 51-59.
[Vol. 9:52
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cede that instances of such lives by any index must be few.3 2 The
general value of life and the ineluctable difficulty in measuring loss
without prior existence render such valuation nonjusticiable by the
courts. But were the proposed new torts of eugenic wrongful life and
wrongful birth legislatable by the courts, they have little to recommend
them as policy.
Costs and Benefits of a Tort of Eugenic Wrongful Life
By any guideline, the costs of the proposed new torts will be great
and the benefits few, small and doubtful. Later33 the costs and benefits
will be carefully articulated to illustrate that the torts should be rejected
on principles neutral to the quality of life and preciousness of life ideol-
ogies. Yet, one cost specific to recognition of a eugenic "wrongful life"
tort is a tendency to produce bitter suits by infants aainst their
progenitors. 34 In dicta, Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, Inc. '- authorizes
such litigation. The bitterness of such lawsuits should be calculated as
a great enough cost itself to persuade courts to reject a tort of eugenic
wrongful life. The constitutional infirmity of such litigation will be dis-
cussed later.36
Having examined the labile and problematical nature of standards
implicated by the torts of eugenic wrongful birth and wrongful life, the
paper will next analyze the nature of breach of such standards.
Breach
Nonfeasance
Nonfeasance is a ground for action much less often than misfea-
sance. An especially attenuated case of nonfeasance is nondisclosure of
information as opposed to misinformation or deceit. Nondisclosure of
information rarely creates liability.37 Affirmative duties to disclose in-
formation arise only in special relationships of trust. Some argue that
the physician-patient relationship is one of trust, but the cases so char-
acterizing the relationship usually discuss or adjudicate property claims
between a physician and patient transacting business other than medi-
cal treatment. 38 The present clinical organization of medicine makes
the physician-patient relationship one between a skillful provider of
bodily care and one seeking such bodily care. The relationship is
analagous to a promisee and an artisan dealing in a matter where skill
in execution of the trade is contemplated. 39 The relationship does not
32. Id at 57-59; Bayles. supra note 25, at 297.
33. See notes 180-194 supra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 144-154 supra and accompanying text.
35. 106 Cal. App.3d 811, -, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980).
36. See Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
37. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 339-40; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 550-51 (1965).
38. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians and Surgeons § 100 (1972).
39. Halligan, Standards of Disclosure by Physicians to Patients. Competing Models of Informed
Consent, 61 LA. L. REV. 9, 26-27, 35-36 (1980).
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create an affirmative duty to disclose facts. Patients go to physicians
for scientific and manual skill in the treatment of disease. If a different
service is expected, it must be demanded. The courts usually conclude
that a physician has some obligation to disclose risks of proposed bod-
ily therapy, the information being incidental to touching.4" The duty to
disclose risk does not arise from a relationship of trust or confidence,
but from the clinical process of proposing treatment, obtaining consent
and cooperation and laying skilled hands on the patient in order to
perform treatment.4 ' The obligation of treating physicians to disclose
risk is an obligation to disclose risk collateral to proposed treatment
and no more. Eugenic wrongful birth and wrongful life torts do not
involve want of information about some collateral effect of treatment
or the manual skill of the physician. There is no claim that any side
effect of treatment materialized. The importance of the informed con-
sent cases is this: there is nothing found in the nature of the relation-
ship between physician and patient which ought to create an
expectation in patients that physicians will come forward with informa-
tion about matters which are not implicated in the drugs, operations
and treatment used. Patients should ask for more information if they
want it. Nondisclosure of information should not be a ground for ac-
tion. This argument logically follows from the corpus juris making
nonfeasance, especially the subset of nondisclosure, especially rare as a
ground for action in negligence.
The policy against creating duties of affirmative action enforceable
in negligence has barred many attractive claims alleging want of action
by defendants to protect plaintiffs at no cost or risk.4 2 And liability
even for negligent interference with efforts by third persons to assist
plaintiff exists only when the defendant actually knows that a third per-
son was imminently about to aid the plaintiff and the defendant negli-
gently "disables" the third person.43 Prosser says that liability in such
cases rests on misfeasance."
Only by strained and sanguinary reasoning could one say that par-
ents who might have chosen to abort a child were about to aid him.
Only by equally strained reasoning could one say that silence by obste-
tricians disables such parents. The true import of complaints advanc-
ing eugenic wrongful life is that obstetricians should take affirmative
action to benefit the parents and, remotely, to "benefit the fetus." Such
complaints postulate an obligation to take affirmative action to stimu-
late yet more affirmative action by others to "benefit" certain plaintiffs
by aborting them before they become legal persons. This proposal
founders once in wrongful birth counts and twice in wrongful life
40. Id. at I1.
41. Id. at 11-12.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314.
43. Id at § 327.
44. PROSSER. supra note 10, at 348.
[Vol. 9:52
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counts on the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. But it
collides with more than that.
The Consent of the Unborn Infant
The unstated major premise of a eugenic wrongful life tort is that a
futurable child while in cellular development would choose nonexis-
tence were he to contemplate future sickness, disease, or handicap. The
New York Court of Appeals expressed the obvious point that no one
can say that a child would choose nonexistence if informed of some
sickness it would have.45 Assuming that an immature being would
choose to continue existence if informed of future sickness, then the
supposed victim would prefer inaction by the physician. The author
believes that this assumption about the prepossessions of a fetus is the
more probable of the two possible assumptions. This assumption takes
a protective, conservative view of the interests and self-determination
of the fetus. Besides objecting to creation of obligations of verbal af-
firmative action, one must also question if inaction of the physician and
inaction of the parents by failure to request information are one com-




Identity of Interested Parties. In a eugenic wrongful life case, a sick
infant allegedly prefers nonexistence as an alternative to diseased life.
But whose interest or preference is it? In no sense can the nonexistence
frustrated be his if by he we mean the now existing plaintiff minor citi-
zen. Tort law requires identification of some individual on whose
rights defendant has trespassed at the time of the misconduct.4 6 An
allegation of wrongful life raises genuine doubt about the identity of
the victim of the wrong. The objection is strongest when the parents
allege that they would not have conceived the child who says his life is
wrongful. The objection persists when the parents allege that they
would have destroyed the being before it became a legal person.
Existence and Nonexistence. The law has no definite position on
broad questions involving goodness of a particular existence, but leaves
such questions to "theologians and philosophers." Engaging in such
determinations leads to judicial "Hobson's Choices" between impaired
existence and nonexistence.47 Still, weak indications of policy favoring
more existence illustrate the weak nature of a wrongful life tort.
The policy that existence be valued is suggested by criminal law
45. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 416, 386 N.E.2d at 815, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
46. Id at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
47. Id at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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definitions of crimes against persons and crimes against property. Un-
lawful taking of any item of another is theft in some degree, and any
person, howsoever ill or near death, may be a victim of battery or
homicide.4" In some jurisdictions there are more specific expressions of
policy preferring existence." The policy is also manifest in presump-
tions against suicide.50
Another indication of policy valuing existence is the comparative
methodology of damage measurement. 51 The comparative method is
pervasive in law manifesting tendencies in humankind toward the view
that nothing which exists can be completely bad. Common law and
jurisprudence partake of this propensity toward affirmation. Intui-
tively, the courts sometimes suppose that affected beings affirm the
same. -
The intuition of judges that no ill child would choose nonexistence
draws on these same predilections to value existence. Unreal harm and
unreal fetal consent are companion barriers to the unreal tort of wrong-
ful life. The tenacious attachment of living things to life leads to public
affirmation of the greater value in existence over nonexistence.
Public Policy. The law does not recognize an interest in nonexis-
tence. In the Becker case,53 the New York Court of Appeals correctly
stated that there is no right to be born perfect or not to be born. To
recognize such an interest as protected at law would contradict estab-
lished values of Anglo-American law.
Self-destruction is condemned by Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The proposition that a court ought to award an infant damages because
his desire to be destroyed was frustrated by an obstetrician is very close
to saying that freedom of self-destruction should be a protected liberty.
But the law does not protect, much less foster, any right to commit
suicide. At common law, suicide was punishable by collection of fines
from the estate of the deceased. In this country, many jurisdictions re-
tain the crime of attempted suicide on the grounds that suicide attempts
disrupt the peace and damage a citizen. Aiding and abetting the at-
48, In the English speaking world "mercy-killing" is homicide and not a reduced form, but plain
murder: good motive, ill victim, and consent are irrelevant. R. PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAw 721
(1957): 25 A.L.R. 1007 (1923). Though only one country creates a complete defense for a
motive of mercy coupled with consent of the ill person, several provide for reduced culpabil-
it) and mitigation of sentence. Silving, Euthanasia. A StudyIn Co'parative Law, 103 U. PA.
L. Rt-v. 350, 386-89 (1954).
49. Abetment of suicide is a common law crime and is arguably indictable under a general ac-
cessorial responsibility statute in a modern code but one giant of criminal law scholarship
thinks that "unselfish abetment" of suicide ought to be decriminalized. G. WIL.LIAMS. THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 310 (1957).
50. See note 56 infra.
51. See notes 47-50 .rupra and notes 52 and 66-74 infra and accompanying text.
S2. Becker. 46 N.Y.2d at 415. 386 N.E.2d at 814. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903. (Fuchsberg. J.. concurring
in relevant part). The concurrence notes the curious nature of interests supposedly affected
and of the identity of their owner in a case alleging wrongful life.
53 Id at 411. 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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temptor is also a crime.-5 For purposes of most litigation, most juris-
dictions presume against suicide,55 and an attempt to commit suicide is
often grounds for involuntary confinement. 6 Jailers and hospital staff
have an obligation in many jurisdictions to prevent suicides by persons
confined in their institution.57 Underlying all of these assurances
against self-destruction is the evaluation of life as valuable.5 1 One
opinion reasons that personal existence is precious because it allows
one to experience something of love which will outweigh suffering."
The same opinion reasons that attitudes of "inalienable" life found in
early American state papers imply that existence is so valuable as to be
inexchangeable with other things.
60
The policy valuing life should operate in a case of a person who will
be sick. Refusing to recognize a right to be obliterated implements pol-
icy generally applicable. Nonrecognition also conforms to the probable
wishes of the unborn creature.6' To determine wishes of the unborn,
one must draw inferences from persons who do communicate. Almost
all persons cling to life tenaciously until their very last moments.12 Dr.
Nolan states that, excepting persons near in time to expiring, he has not
had a patient who truly did not want to live, nor have his colleagues
reported such a patient. In articulating policy, the courts must remem-
ber the general probability that few persons truly do not want to be.
Reality of Harm
Arbitrary Distinctions. In the Becker case,6 3 the New York Court of
Appeals, citing Howard v. Lecher,64 states that torts of wrongful life
involve courts in drawing arbitrary lines between health and illness,
serious disease and less serious disease, and great imperfections and
small imperfections. This the courts should not do.
Everyone has some imperfection. Some defects are severe and per-
vasive; some are mild and narrow. Whether life with one defect is less
precious than life with another 5 is not a medical but a normative, leg-
islative question. Definition and gradation of health and illness or gra-
dation of the quality of life are matters surely beyond the competence
54. W. R. LAFAVE & A. W. Scor CRIMINAL LAW 568-71 (1972). See note 49 supra.
55. See Armot., 85 A.L.R.2d 722 (1962). MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 811 (2d ed.. 1972) savs that
the sources of the presumption against suicide as a cause of death are improbability and
revulsion against suicide.
56. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Incompetent Persons § 146 (1968).
57. 60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal Institutions § 29 (1972); 40 AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals § 33. n. 17 (1972).
58. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 I11. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1951). The Illinois court sus-
tains the dismissal of an action alleging negligently unsuccessful abortion and breach of war-
ranty. The court found it unnecessary to discuss what interests are protected by the law of
warranty, although that issue was raised on appeal.
59. Berman, 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
60. ld at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
61. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 416, 386 N.E.2d at 815, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
62. E.g., W. NOLAN, A SURGEON'S WORLD 280 (1972).
63. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 413-14, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02.
64. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
65. Berman, 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
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of courts if they be within the competence of anyone. If separation and
sorting of relative degrees of health is impossible, how much greater is
the problem of comparing two things which are fundamentally incom-
mutable: ill existence versus nonexistence.
Justiciability and Relative Valuation of Diseased Existence and Non-
existence. There is genuine doubt that birth constitutes harm to one
born in any circumstance. The doubt lies in a reformulation of the
damage paradox discussed above.66 Damage is usually a comparative
notion presupposing changes from earlier to later conditions of the vic-
tim. The supposition fails in wrongful life claims and comparison of
the usual sort is "literally impossible."6 The Berman opinion notes
that courts have no knowledge of nothingness and no experience in
pricing it. 8  Citing its earlier opinion in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,69
Berman reaffirms the observation that nothingness is unmeasurable
and incomparable to any existing thing.7"
The propensity to define harm as loss of another quality and not as
a quality itself is not peculiar to law. Evil is usually conceived as the
absence of good; defect is unfitness. To speak of improvement of life
by way of its destruction is a contradiction.7 In legal thought, the loss
of nonexistence differs from the hardship of ill existence. These two
states are not susceptible to comparison. The Becker case states that
such comparisons must not be taken up by the courts because they are
not within the competence of courts, judges and juries.72 The literal
immeasurability of damages and incommutability of ill existence and
nonexistence in wrongful life cases is the almost universally voiced ra-
tionale for disallowance of the tort. Several opinions also state that the
law should categorically rule that diseased existence is always prefera-
ble to nonexistence as a matter of policy.73 For example, the rationale
of Berman v. Allan74 seems to be that life in general is good, and wrong-
ful life cases should be rejected as contradictions in terms even if in
some special case a particular plaintiff might persuade a particular jury
66. See notes 24-32 supra.
67. Berman. 80 N.J. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11-12 (citing PROSSER, supra note 10, § 55, at 335-38).
68. Berman. 80 N.J. at 427, 404 A.2d at 11-12.
69. 49 N.J. 22. 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
70. Berman, 80 N.J. at 427, 404 A.2d at I 1-12.
71. The most famous exposition of the tendency in such proposals toward internal contradiction
is I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS
ON ETHICS 39 (T. Abbot, trans. 1873).
72. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02.
73. The leading example of the latter approach is case law development in New Jersey. Initially,
in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692, the court expressed the immeasura-
bility of damages as its principal rationale. Several years later, in Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at
427-30, 404 A.2d at 12-13, the court reordered its rationale. The court restated the continu-
ing immeasurability of damages but speculated what should be the judicial response to the
case of a convincing plaintiff testifying to his preference for nonexistence if some advances in
psychology and judicial procedure enabled a comparison which is not now feasible. The
court held that a tort for wrongful life would still be rejected.
74. 80 N.J. 421, 404"A.2d 8 (1979).
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that, subjectively, there is no contradiction. The right not to be is not
and should not be a protected interest.
Causation in Fact
Necessary and Sufficient Preconditions to Causation in Fact
The nature of causation in fact is human reliance by the adult pa-
tients on nondisclosure by the physician. The causation stems from the
decisional processes of the parents who claim that had they known,
they would have decided not to conceive or to have a eugenic abortion.
Plaintiff parents suppose that they need establish nothing about reli-
ance or decisional processes of the third hypothetical decision maker
involved in the three party relationship and may avoid an allegation of
consent by the infant." But, again, who can say that a child would
choose not to be if he were advised early in his cellular development
that he is likely to be ill, imperfect, or handicapped.76 This is not the
only problematical aspect of causation in such cases.
Availability of Eugenic Abortion
Availability of eugenic abortion applies to many allegations of
wrongful life where a plaintiff's mother alleges an "absolute right" to
an abortion as part of the chain of causation. 7I These cases involve not
a therapeutic need but a eugenic desire for abortion. Absent a state
created right to eugenic abortion, the Federal Constitution as inter-
preted gives an absolute right to obtain abortion only during certain
periods and not thereafter.78 The combination of statutory law and the
processes of biochemistry itself will often combine so that the parental
plaintiffs will not have had available the choice they say they would
have made. The want of disclosure by the physician will not in fact
have caused any loss of opportunity. It follows that a sick infant like-
wise cannot state a cause of action because the nondisclosure will often
have been no cause in fact of his existence.79
Proximate Causation
Intervening Causes
Proximate causation is a second look at liability, standards and
damages in order to ascertain if the liability produced by the usual
75. See notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
76. See note 52 supra.
77. See note 170 infra. Cases collected there include failed attempts at sterilization and failure to
advise of risks or to counsel abortion. When plaintiff parents allege a fault of defendant
occurring before conception, they need not allege a lost opportunity to abort in order to
allege consequences.




calculus of other elements promotes the ends of justice.8" The chain of
causation in fact in a eugenic wrongful life or wrongful birth case is
behavioral, dealing with decisional effects and reliance by patients on
information disclosed or not disclosed by physicians. The influence of
the doctrine of proximate causation and its operation in such cases
ought to be apparent. Where the causation in fact is the decision of
another person, then predictability of the consequence is uncertain. 81
In a eugenic wrongful life case, the decisions of more than one person
are or should be involved. One is unable to say with any confidence
what might have been or would have been the decision of the creature
had he known what his circumstances in life would be. Since human
and difficult decisions of persons other than the defendant intervene,
any consequence caused by the nonfeasance or nondisclosure of the
physician is not a proximate cause, but a very remote factor. It would
not be just to impose liability for the consequence. The justice of im-
posing liability raises the point of foreseeability.
Foreseeability
Also relevant to determining proximate causation is the concept of
foreseeability.82 Foreseeable consequences does not mean scientific
prediction as does causation in fact. The notion of foreseeability is a
mixture of probability of consequence in a factual sense and the likeli-
hood of its precontemplation by the defendant. Foreseeability is often
weak as to literal predictability of delivery of a disabled baby and as to
damages. On the other component of foreseeability, how likely is an
obstetrician to consider the possibility of having to pay child support
for a slightly handicapped child of his patient because he did not pro-
vide her with information which might prompt her to destroy the in-
fant? The answer must be not likely. The imposition of child support
liability is not within the likely contemplation of a person practicing
obstetrics. Proximate causation is strained in eugenic wrongful birth
and wrongful life cases.
The Curlender Case
In Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab, 3 the second appellate district
court in California reversed a dismissal of a sick infant's complaint"
against a laboratory alleging fraud and negligence." The defendant
laboratory had analyzed blood specimens of the parents to determine
disease carrier status (not amniocentesis).8 6 The co-defendant physi-
80. PROSSER, supra note !0, at 246, says the confusion of proximate cause with other elements
obscures its real office of limiting liability on an independent ground of fairness.
81. Id at 263-67 (indirect cause), 270-89 (intervening use).
82. Id at 250-70.
83. 106 Cal. App.3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
84. Id at 832, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
85. Id at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
86. Id at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
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cian did not participate in the appeal.8 7 The issue was one of first im-
pression in California."8
To establish causation, plaintiff alleged reliance by her parents on
false negative tests, but did not allege whether the reliance was concep-
tion, failure to test amniotic fluid, or failure to abort.89 The court was
certain that the reliance was "eugenic" in nature, distinguishing eu-
genic from therapeutic medical intervention. 90 As consequences, plain-
tiff claimed costs of care and compensation for enduring Tay-Sachs
disease for the life expectancy of a healthy infant. 9' Plaintiff also al-
leged "guilty knowledge" by the laboratory that their test method was
inaccurate and would often produce false negative findings.
9 2
The reversal instructed the trial court to assess damages to compen-
sate plaintiff for "enduring" her condition during the four year life ex-
pectancy of one with Tay-Sachs disease and for any "special pecuniary
loss" resulting from the condition.9 It also instructed the trial court to
assess damages for "costs of care," apparently meaning costs beyond
those of rearing a healthy baby for four years, and urged the trial court
to consolidate the case filed by the parents to prevent double
recovery.
94
Before stating its rationale, the court reviewed precedent and de-
fined terms. It stated that the case was a sub-specie of "wrongful life"
claims brought by an infant alleging negligence and birth as a conse-
quence. The opinion showed particular interest in Gleitman v. Cos-
grove97 where the defendant had affirmatively misrepresented the
potential for defects in the child after the mother specifically asked for
the information. Curlender correctly stated that the Gleitman rationale
was based on the tradition that compensatory damages "are measured
by comparing the condition plaintiff would have been in" but for the
negligence to his "condition produced by the negligence."9 8 The literal
impossibility of making the comparison precludes adjudication of
wrongful life claims. Curlender expressed sympathy for the punitive
rationale of the Gleitman dissent, noting that the comparative method-
ology of the majority had been adopted by every other jurisdiction,
87. Id at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
88. Id at 814-15, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
89. Id at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
90. Id
91. Id at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81.
92. Id The court was advised that the parents had sued in their own right in a parallel case not
before the court. Id at 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
93. Id at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
94. Id at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
95. Id at 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481. The court traced the term to Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). (Zepeda is the source of the term "wrongful life.") It
noted that the Illinois court denied recovery to an illegitimate infant who sued his father for
causing him to be born illegitimate. It reviews several other cases and uses substantial space
to discuss Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
96. Curlender, 106 Cal. App.3d at 818, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
97. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
98. Curlender, 106 Cal. App.3d at 819, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
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sometimes accompanied by the public policy rationale. 99 The opinion
illustrated the public policy rationale"° by parsing Berman v. Allan 0'
and dwelling on the dissent.
0 2
The Curlender opinion stated that the parents have a power to oblit-
erate the child but failed to state how that pertains to the child's com-
plaint. 0 3 It agreed with the Berman " dissent that an obstetrician has
a direct relationship with the unborn infant but failed to state any im-
plication. The Curlender court then restated the Berman dissent's rea-
soning that evaluation of the infant's claim should start with
"realization that the infant has come into the world and is here, encum-
bered by an injury."'0 5 The opinion' °6 underscored the postulation in
Park v. Chessin ' 7 of a right to be born "as a whole, functional human
being." Curlender then cited several cases for dicta concerning the "in-
terests of society" in correctness of genetic testing to establish a first
rationale.0" The desire of society not to have defective minor citizens
motivated the Curlender court to create a tort in the undesired minor.
This rationale is not compensation of the plaintiff but some punitive
objective. ' 9
Then, Curlender stated that painful existence is the cause for action
without comparative consideration of the alternative but curiously
noted that the pain is felt by all concerned and that parental claims
have been well established." 0 The rationale making the infant proxy
for others became clearer when Curlender stated that "social welfare"
should influence policy, not ethical propositions about "quality of
99. Id.
100. Id at 820, 821, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
101. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). In that case the New Jersey court reiterated their earlier
rationale but stated that their decision would be the same even if some new standard and
extraordinary evidence could demonstrate comparative preferability of nonexistence to dis-
eased life in a specific case. Their new rationale was a policy to value even diseased life more
than nonexistence.




106. Id at 822, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
107. 88 Misc. 2d 179, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976). Curlender passes to discussion of the New York
appellate division's decision in Park v. Chessin and notes that the allegation in Park was an
erroneous affirmative assurance by defendant that there was no risk of the hereditary disease
that had afflicted an older child after plaintiff parents had asked for an opinion. 106 Cal.
App. 3d at 822, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84. Curlender acknowledges that the New York Court
of Appeals overruled Park on the rationale that before-and-after comparison to determine
damages is not available, so that ascertainment of the existence of damages is impossible. Id
108. 1d After citing an Alabama case, Elliot v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978), following the
N.J. and N.Y. decisions, in denying recovery, the opinion cites the decisions in two more
cases and a dissent in another, all three of which were parental claims or so-called wrongful
birth, not wrongful life cases. Id at 824, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86.
109. The court turns to a California case and notes that a bastard may not sue an abortionist for
wrongful life, that his mother can sue for wrongful birth, and that the "benefits conferred"
rule mitigates her damages. Id It proceeds to distinguish that case because the conditions of
bastardy and bodily illness like T.S. disease are different. Id at 486.
110. Id
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life.""' The opinion commented: "genetic defects represent an in-
creasingly large part of the overall national health burden."" 2 As evi-
dence that these costs should be weighed more heavily than existence
per se, the court pointed to the persistent attempts by parents to collect
in wrongful birth and wrongful life litigation" 13 and to the dissents in
prior cases.'
With these values in mind, the opinion quoted prior California
cases enumerating factors to be balanced in judicial legislation.' '" The
court opined that the interests of the "individuals involved and of soci-
ety as a whole" dictated the new tort." 6 By the plural "individuals"
the court must have been referring to parents. By reference to society
as a whole it harkened to the welfare cost of maintaining handicapped
persons. Such rationales might be pertinent in so-called wrongful birth
cases but are bizarre in a wrongful life case claiming that the ill person
would rather not have been born. The court returned to the wrongful
life tort and with underscored words stated that the real crux of the
issue is not duty but damages." 7 It excused itself from analysis of any
other element by reflecting that decisions in other states have been pre-
occupied with damages. The California court resolved the issue by
fiat. 18
The fiat was striking and swift. In one paragraph the court dis-
missed concern for the problem of incomparability of ill health with
nonexistence as an "unnecessary meditation." " 9
The court understood the conceptual problem in noting that the
harm plaintiff asserts is not Tay-Sachs disease itself but "birth-with
such defect."' 2 ° It noted that the unique circumstance was "that the
birth and injury have come hand in hand."'' Having acknowledged
the problem, the court denied any obligation to manage it, pronounc-
ing: "we need not be concerned that had the defendants not been neg-
ligent, the plaintiff might not have come into existence at all."' 22 The
closest thing to a rationale was an appeal to sympathy and redistribu-
tion when it said the "reality" is that plaintiff "both exists and suffers"
due to acts of defendants. 23 The emphasis was on the present fact of
pain, not on the alternative situation. The court wished to redistribute
wealth from the defendant class to presently ill persons and was moti-
vated by sympathy for plaintiffs condition and the intent to stimulate
IlI. Id at 826-27, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Id at 826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
1 15. Id at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88.










eugenic abortion to control welfare costs. There was full recognition of
the incompatibility of the tort with all precedent and pre-existing doc-
trine. The technique was fiat. Having legislated boldly, the court ac-
cepted certain extreme consequences of the new enactment and passed
to them without rationalizing the new law.
The opinion acknowledged that its new tort would be precedent for
intrafamily lawsuits. 24 It conceded that where laboratories and physi-
cians give accurate warnings and parents choose to beget the ill child, a
suit by the child against the parent is authorized by the fiat. "We see
no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being
answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought
upon their offspring." 125 No suggestion of mitigation for conferring the
benefit of existence was mentioned.
To find some support beyond its own positivism, the court returned
to its rejection of the traditional comparative technique for ascertaining
damages and reasoned from sections of the civil code which authorize
damage awards to compensate for "detriment" defined as "harm suf-
fered." 26 The court argued that "harm suffered is an absolute criterion
and not a reference to prior condition." This was a literal reading of
the statutes, but it is not the likely intent of the legislature. The court
calculated damages consistently with its absolutist notion. Rejecting
any duty to make "any attempted evaluation of a right not to be
born,"' 127 it construed the tort as implementation of a right to recover
money "for the pain and suffering to be endured during the limited life
span available" by such plaintiff and to recover any "special pecuniary
loss" resulting from the impaired condition.
28
The appeal to the literal content of a statute absolved the court from
the charge of positivism and usurpation of legislative prerogative, but
the appeal is unconvincing for five reasons.
First, placing the argument near the end of the opinion after an-
nouncement of the rule suggests an insincere afterthought in an other-
wise blunt opinion. Second, the literal statutory construction is weak.
Third, the rule usually applied to construe statutes codifying common
law rules assumes the legislature intends to enact common law doctrine
generally in force in the jurisdiction. This rule implies enactment of
the comparative test of detriment and the benefits conferred credit
where the aim of the legislation is "compensation for loss." Compensa-
tion requires traditional mitigating credits and suggests diminution of
124. id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
127. Id
128. Id To be fully consistent, the court would have to limit recoverable costs of maintenance to
special costs associated with the illness. The opinion appears to do that. The opinion is not
clear because it believes that the issue of maintenance costs will be settled in the parental
claim which it is anxious to see consolidated with the infant's case to prevent double recov-
ery. Id at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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prior good. Loss as a definition of damage suggests the same compara-
tive notion. The Curlender court seized on the word "detriment". Yet
that word also suggests diminution from a prior beneficial state.
Fourth, California precedents insist on application of the benefits con-
ferred mitigation in wrongful birth cases.' 9 Fifth, the statutory ration-
ale is not convincing because it relies on sources outside the
jurisdiction.'3
Curlender had no answer to the genuine problems wrongful life
complaints pose: the intellectual pioblem of ascertaining harm and the
constitutional problem of separation of powers. Curlender rejected the
problems and established new standards motivated by purposes other
than just compensation of the plaintiff. Like the Berman dissent,' 3'
Curlender chose to dwell upon the "encumbrance" of pain without
evaluating the asset. The claim that a codifying act justifies refusal to
compute the net value of the equity is unconvincing and suspicious.
Curlender was class legislation. It was redistributive rather than com-
pensatory. It was judicial legislation. The judges in the Curlender case
claimed to implement the will of the people but fundamentally repudi-
ated representative government and imposed their own will.
The practical effect of the opinion, its language and its spirit, is to
equate nonexistence with birth otherwise normal but with a four year
life expectancy. Post-conception wrongful infliction of the Tay-Sachs
symptoms on a healthy baby with a four year life expectancy would
expose the tortfeasor to the exact same liability under traditional norm
referenced measures. In this sense Curlender equates nonexistence with
healthy life of limited span. The value of actual existence implied by
the opinion is zero. By the lights of the Curlender judges, every hour of
life for a Tay-Sachs baby is only a source of misery. The opinion al-
lows no mitigation for actual existence or for the few months of symp-
tom free living, usually six to twelve, that an early-infantile Tay-Sachs
child has. The encumbrance model of the Berman dissent implies that
the defendant caused a four year normal life and put a heavy lien of
pain on the last 3 to 3.5 years.' 32 This whole calculus is genuinely bi-
zarre, but as far as it goes, Curlender posits the net as the amount of the
lien, the good of living having no equity.
129. Id at 823-27, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86.
130. See Berman, 80 N.J. at 434, 404 A.2d at 15. Principal among these is the Berman dissent
which urges present sympathy for the infant and parents, disregard of pi or conditions or
states, and concentration on "encumbered" existence. Id. The court also cited a student
note which argues forsimple rejection of comparative ascertainment of harm by defining no
existence as bench-mark neutral or zero and defining defective birth as negative value and
healthy birth as positive value. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 482; see
Note, A Cause of Acion for "Wrongful Life" ,4 Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 58
(1971). These are definitions consciously made and imposed as policy decisions to provide a
framework like that of traditional tort law where admittedly one does not already exist.




Nine Criticisms of the Curlender Opinion
Capricious Norms. The equivalent of the lost alternative of nonex-
istence implied by Curlender is normal life of short duration. This is
arbitrary at best. Such a value varies with diseases. Nonexistence as a
standard of comparison cannot vary with the nature of other things
being evaluated by the comparison.
Contrary Empirical Data. In Curlender, the arbiters of policy are
public aid budgetary officers, a few parents who file suits, and a very
few dissenting judges who do not value handicapped existence. These
sources are unrepresentative of general opinion.
Dr. Kubler-Ross reports that "extremely few" of the many hundred
terminally ill patients she followed in prospective studies have at-
tempted to hasten their own death. 33 Those that do use passive means;
they may not accept treatment but do not destroy themselves vio-
lently.'34 The determinants are not pain and disability, but isolation,
loneliness, personality traits, false expectations, and psychological cru-
elty of caretakers. 135 If pain were the reason for persons not to value
life, then suicide statistics would not be so influenced by sex, marital
status and social status.' 36 The classic study of suicide causation con-
firms the negligible effects of pain, physical suffering and disability on
valuation of life.'37 The legal presumption against suicide is relevant
again. 138 To test the question whether lifeper se is preferable to nonex-
istence in the estimation of injured persons, a life close in some sense to
nonlife but compatible with consciousness and the ability to evaluate
must be considered. Existence of a person whose spinal cord has been
transected at C4 and who is experiencing ascending myelitis and necro-
sis of the spinal cord is an existence as near as can be to such a life.
Such a person has no movement or feeling below his neck. Breathing is
labored and as necrosis ascends toward level C3, he can live only with
a mechanical lung. Speaking of just these patients, the leading text in
neurological surgery states that most of these patients express a "genu-
ine desire to continue to live in spite of their horrendous disabili-
ties."' 3 9 In a few words, the Curlender judges sampled the wrong
population.
Public Policy. In a jurisdiction which values lifeper se, policy con-
tradicts the zero valuation of existence in Curlender. Nor is there likely
133. E. KUBLER-Ross, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT DEATH AND DYING 54-55 (1974).
134. Ia. at 55.
135. Id. at 52.
136. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 62, 65, 150, 158, 159, 872 (1975).
137. See E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 224 et seq. (Eng. Trans. 1951). The statistics were French late
19th century data, but the data are not so different today.
138. Supra note 55. Relevant again is Dr. Nolan's quote about the rarity of suicide instincts in
very ill patients in pain. See note 61 supra.




to be found in most jurisdictions a statute creating a right to damages
by virtue of a "detriment to the body" which could invite the literal
construction in which the Curlender court engaged in order to avoid
settled methods of damages assessment.
Unprecedented Methodology. The unsuccessful attempt in
Curlender to measure damages without comparison to prior conditions
opposes precedent. The insistence of a norm outside the present condi-
tion of the plaintiff manifests the general insistence on objective stan-
dards in the law of damages.' 4 ° This insistence on comparison to
established conditions reveals itself in the rule that a personal injury
plaintiff must present specific evidence of his condition before the tort
and may recover only for new harm or for the aggravation, but not the
entirety, of a pre-existing injury.' 4 ' When accepted methodology can-
not conceptually manage a new tort, that indicates the tort is very novel
and ought to be created by the legislature if by anyone.
Disregard of Separation of Powers. The Curlender judges admit
they are legislating and their legislative objectives exceed compensation
for victims of torts. Other courts should not follow this example of
disregard for separation of powers.
Neglect of Elements. Though it has much company, Curlender
should be criticized for its inattention to elements other than interests
protected and measurement of damages. How those other elements cut
against the tort of wrongful life has been urged extensively in this
article.
AtypicalAllegations. The Curlender opinion drifts at points to sup-
posed hardships of parents whose claim was not before the court.
Some allegations pertinent to the parent's claim may have motivated
the court to create the cause of action in the infant as a proxy for the
140. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8 (1973).
141. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF DAMAGES § 29, 107 (1935). Id § 76, at 269-74. Where
future earnings lost are asserted as damages a plaintiff must establish his own life expectancy
and work life expectancy and his own health, age, and strength considered specially. Id.
§ 86, at 299. The most dramatic application of the principle is Dillon v. Twin State Electric
Company, 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932). In that case a boy fell from a very high bridge
over rocky waters which were deep where not interrupted by boulders. A moment later on
his descent he hit naked electrical wires and died of electrocution before he completed his
fall. His chance of survival absent electrocution was small. He might have died from impact
on a rock, or impact on the water, or he might have been disabled from swimming, and have
drowned or have drowned in all events. The appellate court sustained a charge to the jury.
tendered by defense counsel, that in assessing damages for wrongful death by electrocution,
the jury must ascertain the life expectancy of the boy in midair just before hitting the wires.
The exante/expost comparative technique is ingrained in common law. Note, Wrongful Life
andA Fundamental Right to Be Born Healthy: Park v. Chessin; Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFF.
L. R. 537, 542-43 (1977); Tedeschi, On Tort Liabilityfor "Wrongful Lffe", I ISRAEL L. REV.
513, 529 (1966). For an attempt to avoid the traditional comparative approach by inventing
an arbitrary absolute scale, see Note, supra note 130, at 66.
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parents. Ironically, the parental claim there is not so extraordinary as
the infant's claim in eugenic nondisclosure cases.
In Curlender, the parents alleged that they had sought tests and had
given specimens to be studied. They alleged want of skill in the acts of
testing. They alleged misfeasance; negligence consisted of poor per-
formance of concrete tasks and not poor verbal communication. An
obligation arose from the order for laboratory services. As to culpabil-
ity, an allegation of scienter charged that the laboratory knew its meth-
ods produced "false negative" findings.'42 As to reliance, it appears
that the Curlender couple had sought genetic counselling early, perhaps
before conceiving the baby, because the tests were blood tests of the
parents to determine carrier status. Thus, the relationship was bilateral
between the laboratory and the parents for analysis of their specimens.
On these facts, Mr. and Mrs. Curlender might have sued the laboratory
in contract for breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike labora-
tory technique. If the parents had not conceived before obtaining re-
sults, they would not have had to allege willingness to abort in order to
allege reliance and causation. As such, their claims would be a wrong-
ful conception claim which is often treated differently from other
wrongful birth claims. 143 The parental claim in Curlender is probably
within existing forms of action ex contractu. Insofar as a sense of ur-
gency about that claim motivated the court in creating the infant's
claim, to that extent the precedential value of Curlender declines
greatly. Yet, the most important criticisms of the Curlender case are the
ones of fairness and harmony.
Unfairness. Curlender is unfair to defendants in two ways. In not
allowing for mitigation of damages for the benefit of existence which
ineluctably accompanies the articulated detriment, the court does more
than to take sides with one segment in a bitter public debate. It cate-
gorically excludes the possibility of mitigating factors in particular
cases like the several months of symptom-free infantile life of a Tay-
Sachs child. By brushing mitigation aside, the Curlender attempt at
norm-free damages will overcompensate plaintiffs in fact in many
cases. This flaw persists even if one adopts the implications of the court
about unvalued existence in some situations.
A second unfairness is the variability of guidelines with illness. Un-
der Curlender, an unwanted retarded child could sue for the anguish of
dependency for many years of life expectancy contrasted with the four
year life expectancy in Curlender. The implied norms of comparison
(four years of healthy life in one, many years normal life in the other)
used to assess damages have no principled difference. The inequality
of norms cannot stand. Such open-ended and unprincipled variation
should not be.
142. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81.
143. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
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The Authorization of Unconstitutional Intra-Famiy Lawsuits. The
issues in Curlender are, with one exception, common law issues. But to
the extent that Curlender authorizes suits by infants against parents for
failure to abort, the decision conflicts with the constitution.' 44
The question arises whether the constitutional right to have an
abortion implies creation of the wrongful birth and wrongful life causes
of action. The author submits that it does not.
The "abortion cases" in constitutional law are public law cases.
They review criminal or regulatory statutes seeking either to restrain
abortion before the fact or punish it as a crime.' 45 The creation of a
new tort has none of those intentions or effects. In general, changes in
constitutional doctrine do not increase the obligations of private de-
fendants, though such changes may enlarge immunity from suit.'
46
Federal constitutional doctrine is irrelevant to common law policy for-
mation; confusion between public and private law produces inconsis-
tent results. 47 Professor Kader notes that the constitutional cases limit
what states may do by direct prohibition and state what they may do to
protect a variety of competing interests, but do not oblige the states to
protect all such interests.' 48 He points 49 out that Roe v. Wade't 0 has
been cited by equally sincere courts to reach several different conclu-
sions about the permissibility of new torts,'5 ' showing that any connec-
tion between Roe and the new torts is superficial at most. He concludes
that the effect of Roe on private litigation is restrictive, not
expansionary. 152
Professor Kader reasons that the one clear restrictive effect of the
constitutional abortion cases on private law is prohibition of any class
of suit based on fetal death which tends to challenge the mother's deci-
sion to abort or to base liability on that decision.'5 3 The same reason-
ing should prohibit suits against parents for eugenic wrongful life. The
Curlender dicta authorizing suits by infants against parents 154 is incon-
144. See notes 124-25 supra and accompanying text.
145. The Supreme Court has upheld several statutes and ordinances which refused to subsidize
abortions for any but a few, narrow reasons while generously subsidizing parturition. Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977). Following Maher and Poelker, the Supreme Court adjudged for the defendant in
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
146. Richards v. Leimbacher, 131111. App.2d 775, 267 N.E.2d 523 (197 1). The only genuine influ-
ence of recent constitutional doctnne on common law is the effect of first amendment cases
on the tort of defamation. Those cases enlarge the privilege of private publishers to publish
inadvertent defamation of so-called public figures. See PROSSER, supra note 10, at 819-33.
This change limited a tort. It did not compel states to create some new one.
147. Kader, The Law of Tortious Pre-Natal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639, 661-66
(1980); Clasen & Wittenberg, Viability at the Time of Injury." Inconsistent Approaches in Illi-
nois, 67 ILL. B.J. 494 (1979).
148. See Kader, supra note 147, at 661-62.
149. Id at 663.
150. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. See Kader, supra note 147, at 666.
152. Id at 665.
153. Id
154. See notes 124 & 125 supra.
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sistent with the Constitution in this respect. If the estate or guardian of
a fetus or some third person such as a father or grandfather may not
constitutionally sue a mother for aborting, then neither should the child
be allowed to sue her for not aborting.
Unfavorable Judicial Responses to Curlender
In May of 1981, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed judgments
for defendant in Eisbrenner v. Stanley.'55 Parents of a deformed child
had sued an obstetrician alleging failure to diagnose German measles
in the mother during her pregnancy and failure to warn of eugenic
risks. The parents alleged that they would have obtained an abortion
had they known these risks.' 56 In affirming summary judgment for the
defendant, the reviewing court rejected Curlendert ' because the panel
insisted that comparison between sick existence and nonexistence,
though necessary, is not possible.
In Turpin v. Sortini, t ' a girl deaf at birth and her parents sued a
doctor who had treated an older sister for hearing loss. They alleged
that misdiagnosis of the hereditary condition in the older girl caused
the parents to beget the deaf plaintiff infant.'59 The court did not ad-
dress factual distinctions; 60 instead, it rejected Curlender and eugenic
wrongful life entirely. The rationales were five: want of any precedent
for the tort of eugenic wrongful life save Curlender,'6 1 impossibility of a
comparison between ill life and nonexistence which the court held the
new tort would require despite the Curlender sophistry about norm-free
statutory "detriment", 162 tendencies in Curlender to contradict or
weaken detected California policy to value life of all people, 163 the un-
wholesome potential of the eugenic wrongful life tort to serve as prece-
dent for suits by offspring against parentsT6 and respect for legislative
155. 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981).
156. Id at 359-60, 308 N.W.2d at 210. As damages they alleged mental distress and all expenses
of caring for their deformed daughter. Id. The daughter also sued and alleged wrongful life.
Id The trial court had rendered summary judgment for defendant against the infant on the
eve of trial. Id.
157. Id at 365-67, 308 N.W.2d at 213. In accord is Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. App.
198 1). An equally divided vote by the six judges who participated in Speck v. Feingold, -
Pa. -, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) affirmed a dismissal by lower courts of a claim for wrongful life.
158. 119 Cal. App.3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (198 1), petition for hearing granted, No. S.F. 24319
(Aug. 6, 1981) (argued Nov. 30, 1981).
159. Id at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. They alleged that an incidental effect of that misdiagnosis
was failure of the parents to know they were carriers and loss of an opportunity, id.. to avoid
another pregnancy. Only the claim of the deaf infant was before the court, id., on appeal of a
trial court order sustaining a demurrer to her complaint. The appellate court affirmed.
160. Id. The Turpin court might have distinguished or limited Curlender. In Turpin there was no
direct relationship between defendant doctor and any plaintiff, and foreseeability or direct-
ness of consequences was also very remote. Defendant apparently was an ear-nose-head
specialist whose diagnoses and treatments will rarely suggest eugenic implications and from
whom people would not likely expect genetic counseling. His patient had not been the par-
ents or the fetus but an older child of the family
161. Id
162. id at - 174 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
163. Id at -. 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
164. Id at - 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33.
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prerogative. The court articulated three aspects of eugenic wrongful
life claims which require legislation before the courts may entertain
them. "'65 First is the methodology to assess damages. Another is sub-
stantive definition of the right to be born well, that is, legislative defini-
tion of illnesses, their gradation, and their classification into those that
make life actionable and those that do not. 66 A third aspect is revision
of other legislation whose values or objectives contradict eugenic con-
siderations. ' 6 ' The dissent brushed aside all five rationales save incom-
parability. 68 The dissent argued that a claim of a sick infant for
material support may be derived from the wrongful birth claim of the
parents.' 69 This turns the parent-child relation on its head. But the
intriguing dissent does illustrate one thing: claims of parents and those
of infants on account of nondisclosure of eugenic information cannot
be separated sharply. The nearly universal rejection of eugenic wrong-
ful life claims should inhibit creation or expansion of causes for action
by parents on account of birth of a sick child.
On August 6, 198 1, the California Supreme Court granted a petition
for hearing in this case. Arguments were heard on November 30, 198 1.
Summary to Part One
To create a tort of wrongful life on account of nondisclosure of eu-
genic information is to deny the inevitably tripartite relationship of ob-
stetrician, mother, and unborn child. The law has other forms less
drastic which can avoid that consequence, still honor reproductive
choice as a value, and respect freedom of conscience of medical practi-
tioners. The middle ground obliging physicians to supply honest an-
swers to honest questions or to refer an inquiring patient to a good
source of data avoids as well the effect of delegating legislation of val-
ues to one faction of one profession and makes it unnecessary for
courts to seek a norm where none has arisen either by legislation or
widespread consensus. That same middle course makes it unnecessary
for courts to grade values of lives of citizens, an enterprise beneath the
dignity of free courts of justice if not downright sanguinary. This mid-
dle course proposed is more contractual in nature and expects a bit of
self reliance and initiative in prospective parents. That may imply less
conscious eugenic selection overall than would the uniform compulsion
to affirmative action implied in delictual obligations of the sorts lately
advanced. Yet, that is good because the costs of a sudden increase in
eugenic selection and decision making will surely outweigh the benefits
unless there be gradual parallel adjustments in other parts of civic life.
165. id at-, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
166. Id
167. Id at-, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
168. Id at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 133-36.
169. Id at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35. See also notes 155-157 supra.
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The middle ground penalizes deceit and breach of contract, not mere
nonfeasance.
Yet, even that moderate approach cannot pierce the barriers oppos-
ing a claim of eugenic wrongful life, as opposed to wrongful birth. The
impenetrable obstacle is interests protected. Nonexistence is not an in-
terest in the usual sense and speaking of it as an interest of the one
whose existence is the subject is especially unmanageable. Another
layer of the same impenetrable barrier is the difficulty of grading differ-
ent conditions of life relative to one another and deciding their worth
so as to separate those lives actionable as wrongful from those not ac-
tionable. Direct causation of harm is also absent. The one case in
American law that might be construed to authorize suit by an infant for
nondisclosure of eugenic information to the parents has little preceden-
tial value due to the adverse reaction to that opinion.
PART TWO: EUGENIC WRONGFUL BIRTH
Introduction
A eugenic wrongful birth complaint claims, in essence, loss of the
opportunity to prevent conception or to obtain a eugenic abortion.
Claims of lost opportunity to have a eugenic abortion must be distin-
guished from cases where plaintiff sought a therapeutic abortion which
was not successfully performed. All authorities opposing the wrongful
life tort apply as well to eugenic wrongful birth cases. Arguments
made in Part One concerning duty, relationships and standards apply
identically to eugenic wrongful birth cases.' 70 Conversely, many argu-
ments given in the next three subsections 7' also preponderate against
the wrongful life tort. The following discussion concerns claimed bene-
fits and social and private costs of creating a new tort of eugenic wrong-
ful birth.
Duty, Costs and Benefits
The discussion of duty in Part One indicated that the detriments to
society produced by creation of either eugenic tort preponderate
against creation of a duty of affirmative action to disclose eugenic
risks. "'72 Now the Article will balance costs and benefits that a legisla-
170. Ihe annotation at 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978 & Supp. 1981) collects both wrongful life and
wxongful birth cases. As stated in note 8 supra, wrongful life claims rarely occur alone.
Parents, however, often assert wrongful birth claims without making wrongful life claims on
belialf of their infant. Three cases decided since the cited supplement appeared, where
claims of wrongful birth and wrongful life were joined are: Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022
(Fla. App. 1981); Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.w.2d 209 (1981);
Speck v. Feingold, - Pa. -, 439 A.2d 110 (1981). In one recent case, both claims were made
but only the wrongful birth claim reached the state Supreme Court. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87
NJ. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981). Part Two of this paper is directed to wrongful birth claims but
necessarily refers at some places to wrongful life claims.
17 1..See notes 180-194 infra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
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ture or a reviewing court weighs in deciding whether or not to create a
new duty, obligation, or standard requiring conduct of a particular
type. The discussion will illustrate that costs far exceed benefits. The
overarching purpose is to show that providency of a eugenic wrongful
birth tort is an issue of a legislative nature reserved for legislative deter-
mination. In the interests of consistency and careful allocation of gov-
ernmental power, the article will first discuss two limiting prefaces to
calculation of benefits and costs.
When the judicial system is privileged or authorized to adjust pri-
vate obligations or to make new ones, the judge sitting as the judicial
official of government makes or defines new general standards and re-
vises relationships among classes of private persons; no ad hoc collec-
tion of citizens on one jury in one trial may do those things. 7 3 An
allegation of negligence merely invokes consideration of the tort of
negligence. Whether the form of action encompasses a class of transac-
tions is a question of law and policy for the judge. When disputes over
the content of established custom arise in professional malpractice
cases, the jury will deliberate on this question, but whether to adopt the
practices of a trade as a norm, thereby delegating lawmaking power to
a profession,' 74 is a question of law and policy for the legislature or
reviewing court. Judge Hand and Justice Cardozo pointed out that al-
legations implicating a new area of behavior beg questions of policy:
should the behavior be regulated by the private law of torts, what tort
should govern, and what sort of norms should apply?" 5 When such
questions of legislative policy appear, there is little room for innovation
by the court system.
The traditional Anglo-American method to evaluate imposition of
new private obligations is the calculation of costs and benefits. This
methodology is particularly appropriate in assessing expansions of the
tort, of negligence. The opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co. 176 is the most famous formulation of this
three way calculus.' 77 One first calculates the cost of compliance with
the would-be obligation. Next one calculates the benefit to be achieved
by the.new obligation, discounting that by the probability of its occur-
rence absent the new proscription or mandatory requirement. Judge
Hand does not suggest that judges should readily undertake such com-
putations. He says only that when legislative reasoning is authorized, a
court should employ such a balancing process.
173. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.10 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or
TORTS § 285. See also PROSSER, note 10 supra, at 105-08.
174. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 212-14, 228-31 (1937); I K.
Davis, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 3.12, 193 (2d ed., 1978); Halligan, The Standard of Diclo-
sure by Physicians to Patients. Competing Models of Informed Consent, 41 LA. L. REv. 9. 25-
35 (1980).
175. See note 23 supra.
176. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
177. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 173, at 928-36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291:
PROSSER, supra note 10, § 31, at 145-49.
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If the proposed rule touches and concerns the subject matter juris-
diction of the courts and is within doctrinal boundaries of pre-existing
law, courts may undertake legislative reasoning to limited degrees
when there is no indication that the political departments of govern-
ment would treat the consideration as an invasion of their prerogatives.
Creation of a eugenic wrongful birth or wrongful life tort is not on the
legitimate agenda of the courts. Were it within the constitutional
agenda of courts to consider the providency of either tort, traditional
considerations indicate that neither tort should be created because
probable benefits fall far short of probable costs.
With these disclaimers, the article will employ the calculus outlined
by Judge Hand by discussing claimed benefits and costs as applied to
eugenic information pertinent to Tay-Sachs disease. Tay-Sachs disease
was the imperfection implicated in Curlender78 and several other
cases.'7 9 It is so horrid a disease as to create an analytically precise
example. If eugenic wrongful birth and wrongful life claims cannot
find support on the hard facts of Tay-Sachs disease, then the same
analysis applies to less pathetic hereditary diseases also.
Asserted Social Benefits of New Torts of Eugenic Wrongful Birth or
Eugenic Wrongful Life
Imperfect Reliability of Tests. Eugenic tests are not as reliable as
one may suppose. For example, amniocentesis tests can produce false
negative findings in the diagnosis of Tay-Sachs disease." The
Curlender opinion'' illustrates that blood screening tests are also less
than perfectly reliable. Some possibility of error is inherent in the par-
ticular testing procedure. Reliability of Tay-Sachs carrier screening de-
pends upon age, sex, health, drug usage and presence of certain
illnesses. Pregnancy also adversely affects reliability.' 82  Another
source of error is human error. Quality control in genetic testing labo-
ratories has become a problem at the present time and would be an
increasing problem if the number of transactions were to increase
markedly or suddenly.'83 The benefits of information and testing are
not so secure or so certain as some presuppose. False negative findings
greatly diminish the benefits of the whole testing enterprise. The pros-
pect of a false positive result is even more striking. The consequence is
not merely a reduction of the supposed benefits of the tort but imposi-
tion of an enormous new cost in the destruction of healthy fetuses be-
gotten by people who want to have them. Another cost of false positive
findings would be unnecessary restriction of subsequent reproductive
178. See note 82 supra.
179. Cases in notes 8 & 10 supra contain a number of Tay-Sachs instances.
180. Milunsky, ,4mniocentesis, 295 NEw ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 377, 379-80.
181. See notes 86-128 supra.
182. Kaback, Detection of TS Carriers, in GENETIC COUNSELLING 207 (DeLa Cruz and Lubs,
eds., 1977).
183. See note 182 supra.
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activity in some couples. These unreliabilities cumulate with other un-
certainties and statistical factors showing the low incidence of inherita-
ble diseases to give serious reason for even ardent advocates of
eugenics to pause.
The Incidence of Inherited Disease and Mass Screening Programs.
Tay-Sachs disease is an autosomal recessive inherited disease. The in-
heritance is not sex linked; in order to suffer the disease, one must in-
herit the gene from each of one's parents. 84 If one inherits the
predisposing gene from one side only, that person will be a carrier who
will not suffer the disease. If only one of a child's parents is a carrier, it
is strictly impossible for the child to inherit Tay-Sachs disease although
the child might become a carrier. The torts of wrongful birth or wrong-
ful life imply that one in a later generation could sue the obstretrician
who had failed to disclose information to one's grandmother, great
grandmother, or great great grandmother. Even if one has a father and
mother who carry an autosomal recessive disease gene, the probability
that one will contract the disease is one in four. One also has a two in
four chance of being a carrier and a one in four chance of being free of
the trait altogether. 85 But how probable is it that a person is a carrier?
The incidence of carrier status is low for most inherited diseases.
Tay-Sachs disease has a predilection for some Jewish people, the
Ashkenazim Jews from Eastern Europe. Among Ashkenazim, the inci-
dence of the trait is one in forty.'8 6 In the United States there are no
pure Ashkenazim populations and subpopulations. Due to migration
and intermarriage, the incidence of carrier status in this country is
much less, even in neighborhoods generally composed of Ashkenazim.
Yet, Curlender187 implies that all Jewish people in the United States be
screened for Tay-Sachs disease. This great burden on a large subpopu-
lation is little justified by the small incidence of the trait. Tay-Sachs
disease has a strong predilection for Ashkenazim, but it is not unheard
of in other races and nationalities. By the logic of Curlender, anybody
in the United States should be counselled to have screening tests and,
in many cases, amniocentesis tests. The program would require great
cost and inconvenience to detect very few carriers and far fewer af-
fected infants. Accompanying the effort, expense, and pain would be a
great deal of stress and a certain amount of erroneous findings with
attendant costs. To illustrate the small amount of useful information
generated by the mass program Curlender proposes, a bit of arithmetic
is appropriate. First, assume that it is possible to identify people with a
conducive geneology. Considering populations of pure Ashkenazim,
one in forty husbands and one in forty wives will have the trait. Thus
184. R. BEHRMAN, NEONATOLOGY 435 (1977).
185. A. EMERY, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GENETICS 94-107 (1974); BEHRMAN, supra note 184, at
435; See note 205 supra, at 204.
186. R. BEHRMAN, supra note 184, at 25.
187. See note 83 supra.
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only one in every 1,600 couples will have two carrier parents. Only one
in four children of these couples will have the disease. Even in a com-
munity of pure Ashkenazim, only about one in every 6,400 children
will be affected with Tay-Sachs disease. Even if identification of fe-
tuses with the disease and the associated opportunity to destroy them
can be said to benefit a few individual parents, there is no net societal
good.
The medical conduct necessary to avoid liability of the sort
Curlender advances is insistence that every Jewish couple have blood
screening tests and that one of every 1,600 Jewish women have amni-
ocentesis for every pregnancy. This conduct will eliminate a disease
with a natural incidence of at most one in 6,400 births in one subpopu-
lation.'88 These figures understate the costs of screening and overstate
the frequency of harm avoided because the Ashkenazim have dis-
bursed over the continent and mingled with others.
Private Costs
Not all social costs will be felt by particular couples who are
screened. The obvious costs incurred by the obstetrical patient and her
husband include time, physical discomfort, and financial burdens. One
author estimates that the cost of Tay-Sachs laboratory work was $250
in 1980.189 Under the test program advanced by Curlender, every Ash-
kenazim wife of childbearing age and her husband would undergo car-
rier screening including blood tests and biochemical analysis. In
addition, about one in 1,600 wives would take the amniocentesis test or
would be counselled to do so for every pregnancy. The accumulated
costs would be very great. At the present time, most patients and most
physicians do not advocate the sort of program which is the logical
consequence of Curlender torts.
Social Costs
Eight additional costs not fully explored earlier support rejection of
eugenic wrongful birth torts.
Lost Fetal Lfe and Associated Costs. False positive test results will
produce undesired loss of healthy fetal life. This is a great social cost
when a state has declared a policy that fetal life is valued. Such poli-
cies make no distinction between perfect and imperfect fetuses.
188. To review the mathematics, the probability of carrier status is 1/40 at most. The probability
of affliction of an infant is 1/4, given carrier status of both parents. One-quarter times 1/40
equals 1/6400. Once a couple has one child with Tay-Sachs, they and their offspring and
many other blood relatives are alerted and are likely to limit reproduction or undergo tests.
This reduces the incidence of afflicted babies. Afflicted infants never survive to pass on the
trait. Also, the incidence of carrier status in most populations is far smaller than one in forty.




Collateral Health Factors of the Mother and the Fetus. Amni-
ocentesis tests occasionally cause hemorrhage and infection in the
mother and the child and breathing problems in the baby after birth.
As such testing increases, the general elevation of these risks will be-
come social costs bearing on the problem. Also, the incidence of spon-
taneous abortions caused by amniocentesis may be as much as 1.5% of
women tested.1g° Increased fetal life lost by way of spontaneous abor-
tion imposes an additional cost accumulating with lives lost as a result
of false negative findings.
Economic Effects. A successful program of screening and amni-
ocentesis testing would require a great amount of planning. The
amount of new resources required for a mass program of screening for
Tay-Sachs disease "would be enormous."'' The resources would in-
clude trained manpower, new equipment, new laboratory facilities, and
a great deal of coordination. The coordination necessary would in-
clude cooperation between the medical community and the educational
community. The involvement of the educational apparatus is essential
to assure the effectiveness of the program and to assure that the pro-
gram does not create social problems instead of solving them.
Anxiety and Stigmatization. Creation of a new tort which effectively
obliges all obstetricians to inquire into the racial background of great
numbers of patients is an act likely to produce stigmatization of some
members of relevant racial groups and a great deal of anxiety within
those groups unless the activity is undertaken with correlative man-
dates to educational and other apparatus of the government who can
deal with such consequences. 9 2 These concerns involve not only indi-
vidual anxiety but the general mental health and social relations of the
community.
Judicial Costs. An obvious cost of creating a eugenic wrongful birth
tort is the flood of litigation brought upon the courts. Some of this new
litigation is likely to be insincere or fraudulent for the following rea-
sons. The temptation to commit perjury in order to obtain child sup-
port assistance is great to many persons. Such perjury is difficult to
control because the causation alleged is subjective reliance. It is too
easy and too tempting to say after the fact what one would have done
had he had certain information. It would be extremely difficult to op-
pose insincere claims of subjective reliance. The judicial resources ex-
190. GENETICS AND THE LAW 53-56 (G. Annas and A. Milunsky, eds., 1976); Note, Alidirimester
Amniocentesisfor Prenatal Diagnosis., Safety andAccuracy, 236 J. A. M. A. 1417-76 (1976);
Goldstein, Minimizing the Perils o/Amniocentesisfor Prenatal Diagnosis, 237 J. A. M. A.
1336-38 (1977).
191. See Kabeck, supra note 182 at 205.
192. Id at 188.
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pended in sorting sincere from insincere claims would be enormous
and detrimental to the conduct of the court's other business.
Disrupted Family Harmony. A court should also consider disruptive
effects on family life created by a tort of eugenic wrongful birth. The
necessary reliance allegation states that the plaintiff parent would have
aborted a now living child because that child is imperfect or in some
way unacceptable. The child who becomes aware of this allegation
must be enormously and gravely affected. The effect on other children
in the family must also be grave and demoralizing. A sibling might
well consider the question, "how acceptable am I to my parents; did
they entertain the possibility of destroying me as well; how wanted or
not am I?" Consider also the allegation's effect on parents and grand-
parents when the hereditary disease is not recessive but dominant.
Effect on Cooperation Between Patients and Physicians. Requiring
physicians on a mass basis to undertake eugenic counselling of patients
who do not want such counselling and find it offensive must have the
effect of reducing cooperation between physicians and patients. Coop-
eration will be diminished as the physician appears to sell the screening
services. The new tort would oblige doctors to refer patients for testing
which frequently will produce no findings or information of any use to
the patient. This will demoralize the patient and give him the feeling
that he is a consumer being pressure sold by physicians marketing .new
and unsuccessful laboratory services. Opinions acknowledging a
wrongful birth tort mandate this expense. The expense increases if
physicians react defensively or if the new tort is exploited to sell unnec-
essary laboratory services. Good rapport and cooperation between
health providers and patients are things that the law should try to ad-
vance. Creation of the new eugenic torts would do nothing but the
contrary.
Efficiency of Medical Practice. The lengthy and costly education of
a physician trains him for skillful administration of medicine, perform-
ance of surgery and performance of indicated tests. Distinguished from
the role of physician is the role of educator. Physicians are not neces-
sarily the best of health educators, nor do they claim to be. The law
should not impose the role of health teacher on the doctor. If society
would enlarge eugenic counselling and other health education services,
it should be done by public law through educational and health
agencies.
A reasonable allocation of manpower and a reasonable respect for
specialization of labor leads to the conclusion that the creation of the
new tort of eugenic wrongful birth is ill advised. 193 Society should use
physicians for tasks that they do best and reserve other duties for other
193. Id at 182.
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segments. An obstetrician is in essence a very highly skilled tradesman
and an applied scientist, not a teacher or educator. To the extent physi-
cians must do things that they are not best qualified and trained to do,
society looses a valuable resource of human investment in medical edu-
cation. If society obliges physicians to spend time talking about illness,
they will have less time available to treat disease. Physicians have a
large responsibilty already. Society should think carefully before im-
posing some additional affirmative verbal obligation detracting from
performance of established tasks using principal abilities.
Using the traditional reviewing court rationale of United States v.
Carroll Towing Co. 194 to assess expansion of negligence, courts should
reject the tort of eugenic wrongful birth because the costs are great and
the benefits, if any, are few. Eugenic nondisclosure is so novel and so
political in nature that courts should not undertake to do the Carroll
analysis. Eugenic expansion is not a small new step in settled jurispru-
dence, but a huge step in a new direction. The several social costs
should lead an agency reasoning legislatively to reject torts of eugenic
wrongful birth and wrongful life also. But more than that, courts
should refrain from erecting new torts whose creation requires legisla-
tion or delegation of legislative power to private professions.
Widespread Opposition
Fewer than ten per cent of women advised that their fetuses risk
serious inherited diseases undertake the amniocentesis test when told
about its availability.1 95 Medical opinion divides as to when risk is
great enough to justify screening programs followed by amniocentesis
tests.' 9 6 When honest opinions differ so much, affirmative action
should not be required.
Nonfeasance and Cognizability of Damages
Nondisclosure of information should not be defined as a breach in a
case of eugenic information. Comments. concerning nonfeasance by
nondisclosure of information in wrongful life cases are also pertinent in
wrongful birth disputes." However, damages analysis differs between
the two asserted eugenic torts.
Mental Equanimity and the Tort of Negligence
Interests Protected Most jurisdictions do not recognize the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress; some are extremely restrictive
in allowing claims for intentional interference with mental equanim-
194. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
195. 241 J. A. M. A. 1667 (1979) (Medical News Page).
196. Chapman, Your Odds in the Prenatal Gamble, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 32,
(2d ed. B. Knight 1976).
197. See notes 37-45 supra.
1982]
Journal of Legislation
ity. '98 Mental equanimity is an interest rarely protected by any form of
action and almost never protected by the tort of negligence.' 99 Typical
interests protected by negligence are tangible property or integrity of
the body. Mental equanimity is not protected on account of abuse
through insincere or exaggerated claims and a conscious legal desire to
limit liability for unintentional action. Negligence is not scienter but
inadvertent conduct.
In many wrongful birth cases, parents do not seek to recover dam-
ages for mental distress. When they do make such claims, results vary.
The New Jersey case of Berman v. Allan2" does not allow recovery for
grief but does allow it for the annoyance of an unwanted relation-
ship.201 But as the Becker case declared,2 °2 perfection and what imper-
fection may cause disappointment to the parents are questions
problematical in the extreme. A handicapped child will cause some
persons joy; at worse, emotions will be mixed.20 3
Nonjusticiability. Techniques of common law damage assessment
break down in assessing the amount of mental distress in eugenic
wrongful birth cases. The extent of discomposure or disequilibrium of
the mind is a very difficult matter to measure. As Howard v. Lecher
2°
states, the equation of alleged mental distress with monetary amounts is
an extreme case of the legal fiction of monetary damages in noncom-
mercial litigation. The fiction is necessary in that no other practical
remedy for past harm in private litigation exists, but operation of the
fiction must be controlled in the interests of reason and fairness.
20 5
The Becker opinion states that parents of a handicapped child must
respond to the birth with mixed emotions.2°  Besides the disappoint-
ment, there will likely be emotions such as inspiration, love and joy at
the birth. These positive emotions necessarily mitigate the effect of
negative ingredients.20 7 Computation of some net amount of emotional
distress balancing accounts among these mixed emotions is an intolera-
ble, speculative and impossible measurement for any court or jury.
208
198. Sabin, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress-Seventeen Years Later, 66 ILL. B.J. 248
(1978). See also White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kansas, 1981) for an
allegation of intentional infliction of mental suffering in a wrongful birth case.
199. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E. 2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
200. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8.
201. Id at 433-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15. With no discussion, the order of the court in Speck v.
Feingold, - Pa. -, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) allowed parents in a eugenic sterilization case to sue
for mental distress.
202. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01.
203. Id at 416, 386 N.E.2d at 815, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903. In accord is Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d
1022 (Fla. App. 1981).
204. 42 N.Y.2d at 111, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
205. Id. at 112, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 365.





If anyone would undertake such a computation it should be with gui-
dance provided by the legislature. 20 9 To determine what conditions of
infants produce more sorrow than love requires arbitrary and artificial
distinctions.2 ' ° In the absence of legislated yardsticks, damages are in-
commensurable and nonjusticiable and should not be cognizable.
Cognizability of Costs of Child Care
Derivative Economic Claims and Negligence. In common law, a
plaintiff is not typically able to recover for harm to another person.2'
Parental claims by virtue of a condition of their children are exceptions
to this rule and must be narrowly construed.21 2 Such claims are not
often entertained and are derivative in nature, meaning that they de-
pend upon existence of the infant's claim. 1 3 The parents may not
maintain an action unless the child has an actionable cause against the
same defendant by virtue of the same condition. Contributory negli-
gence barring the minor's claim automatically bars action by the par-
ent. ' The doctrine of derivative tort reflects the sentiment that
negligence should be limited to decent bounds and that the whole law
of tort must be limited to reasonable perimeters. Protection of concrete
property and integrity of the body are sufficient missions for the tort of
negligence. Claims for medical costs of a diseased child are purely
financial in nature. 215 At least one wrongful birth opinion2 6 appreci-
ates this distinction in awarding a very limited recovery for the obstetri-
cal costs of birth, emphasizing that these were costs of attention to the
body of the mother. The next inquiry is why purely economic interests
are not protected by the tort of negligence.
209. Wilcyznski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App.3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (1979).
210. See Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365; Becker, 46
N.Y.2d at 413-14, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
211. Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL.. L. F. 493 (1962).
212. Id at 494-95.
213. Id at 494-95. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 419-20, 386 N.E.2d at 817, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06;
PROSSER, supra note 10, § 125, at 891-94; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 703.
214. Foster, supra note 211, at 427. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 129, at 938. An example of the
strict application of the consequences of the derivative nature of parental claims in tort on
account of a necessity of caretaking of the child is Jones v. Schmidt, 349 Il1. App. 336, 110
N.E.2d 688 (1953). In that case a child was hurt when it trespassed upon land of defendant.
The land was in a dangerous condition but the child was a trespasser and the traditional law
is that a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser except to avoid dangerous nuisances attrac-
tive to child trespassers. Conditions were dangerous but there were no attractive nuisances
in the Jones case. The child had no cause of action and neither did the parents.
215. Economic interests are somewhat protected by the law of torts, although an occasional case
suggests that it is the office of the law of torts only to protect bodily integrity, personal repu-
tation, and tangible property. Koplin v. Chrysler Corp., 49 III. App.3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100
(1977). A better andnarrower statement is that the forms of action of negligence and strict
liability do not protect economic interests, so that economic interests are protected only
against intentional tortious interference or deliberate unfairness. PROSSER, supra note 10,
§ 79, at 517-25, and § 83, at 952-54.
216. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App.3d at 63, 391 N.E.2d at 488. Some courts say that lim-
ited claims of parents for obstetrical costs and pain should be allowed and that they would




Practical problems in adjudicating economic claims and the more
compelling quality of tangible trespasses are some of the reasons why,
absent a contractual or statutory ground, the common law does not al-
low claims by third persons for increased cost of maintaining sick per-
sons. Such claims would create a tendency towards multiple litigation
and a risk of multiple recovery. Rules requiring crediting of judgments
would mitigate these unwholesome effects. Butjudicial management of
those offsets would complicate litigation and further confuse the law of
torts, while inadvertence and the settlement process are likely to result
in double recoveries in some cases despite good management. Deliber-
ate conception of parental claims as strictly derivative in nature is not
only logically elegant but ethically and juridically sound. Because pa-
rental claims are derivative, cases rejecting the tort of wrongful life are
compelling authority for nonrecognition of wrongful birth in a eugenic
context.
All jurisdictions save one2 7 appellate district in California are
steadfast in asserting2 8 that an infant may not make any claim on ac-
count of his imperfection. This implies that a parent has no claim by
virtue of imperfection of his child. The article will now discuss the
three main damage patterns that have developed from the wrongful
birth cases.
The most frequent damage pattern allows parents to recover costs
of caring for a handicapped child born on account of fault of a physi-
cian. 9 One state arguably does not allow parents to recover cost of
care."0 A third group of cases22' recognizes a distinction between ordi-
nary and extraordinary costs. Allowing recovery only of special incre-
mental costs, these cases create great practical problems in separating
and segregating costs. These cases reason that, in a eugenics case, the
parents wanted to have a baby. They did not seek to avoid ordinary
expenses of child care, thus, loss is limited to the additional expense of
raising a more costly child. Whereas the cases denying recovery for
economic cost of care articulate best with general tort doctrine, the
third group of cases highlights the doctrinal and practical difference
between lost opportunity for therapeutic and eugenic abortion. The
217. The sole exception is Curlender, 106 Cal. App.3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
218. See note 8 supra.
219. Excepting the first two cases cited in note 220 infra and the cases cited in note 221 infra, all
the cases cited in notes 8 & 170 supra appear to allow recovery of all costs of care.
220. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 I11. App.3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979). But see Cochrum v.
Baumgartner, 99 I11. App.3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (198 1)further appeal docketed, No. 55733
(Feb. 2, 1982). New Jersey had appeared to belong in this second category but now appears
to belong in the third. Compare Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) with
Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
221. Besides New Jersey, these states include Florida, Texas and Wisconsin. Moores v. Lucas,
405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex., Civ. App. 1975);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wisc., 1975). Arguably once
in this third category, Pennsylvania now probably belongs in the first. Compare Gildiner v.
Thos. Jefferson Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) with Speck v. Feingold, - Pa.-,
439 A.2d 110 (1981).
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distinction is critical when state policy values life.2 22
If something is valued as a matter of state policy, a lost opportunity
to destroy the thing cannot be cognizable as damages. Such is the es-
sence of lost opportunity to have a eugenic abortion. In many jurisdic-
tions, state policy forbids recognition of eugenic wrongful birth
regardless of actionability of wrongful birth involving therapeutic abor-
223Yeeo lsee-tion. Yet, economic losses associated with lost opportunity for eu
genic abortion are very hard to measure even if the underlying values
are consistent with state policy.
Measurement and Adudication of the Economic Claims of Parents.
The mixed emotions which lead the courts to decline to treat mental
equanimity as an interest protected by the tort of negligence also com-
plicate assessing costs of care as damages because the positive emotions
also mitigate financial damages. 224  Even the financial costs are prob-
222. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App.3d at 57, 63, 391 N.E.2d at 483, 488.
223. In the abortion funding cases, supra note 145, the Supreme Court found both federal policy
and policy in several states to favor childbirth and support of perinatal and neonatal life and
to weigh them more heavily than maternal mental health and economic well-being and other
interests. The states included Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Missouri. In Turpin v. Sortini,
119 Cal. App.3d 670,-, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130-32, (198 1),petitionfor hearing granted, No.
S.F. 24319 (Aug. 6, 1981) (argued Nov. 30, 1981), the California Court of Appeals found
manifest in California a state policy to value all life including life of very ill infants just born
and in its research found like policy expressed in opinions from New York. New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. California excludes abortion from procedures covered by its Medi-Cal pro-
gram and deleted the eugenic abortion clause from the ALl Model Act when it passed it.
Note, Survey of Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177 (1972).
At the time of the 1972 survey just cited: four states banned all abortions and punished them
as felony; thirty states punished all abortions save those required to save the life of the
mother; one forbade all abortions save those required to save the life of the mother or to
terminate a pregnancy in a victim of rape; one state allowed abortion to save the life or
health of the mother; one state, California, had passed the ALl Model Act but without the
eugenics clause, to allow early abortions, therapeutic abortions for victims of crimes, but not
late eugenic abortion; ten states had passed the ALl Model Act intact; three other states had
few restrictions on abortions. Thus, about thirteen states allowed eugenic abortions late
enough to make amniocentesis of use in deciding to abort. Excepting New York, those thir-
teen were not populous states. Even that status of things represented a liberalization in the
preceding ten years in some seventeen states and the trend toward liberalization had slowed
very much. In many jurisdictions, the stimuli to change were the ALl Model and the
Thalidomyde scare, both of which stimuli had abated. On the other hand, the Thalidomyde
motivation was eugenic in nature though it did not involve inherited traits. 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
177, 179-80 (1972); see notes 21-33 supra. Also, one year later, Justice Blackmun noted that
three more states had passed the ALl model, though none of the populous states had done so
save California which excised the eugenics clause. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37
(1973). This history of American legislation shows early antipathy to abortion, and, after the
civil war, development of thorough repungnance to it. 410 U.S. at 139-42. The limits on
legislation placed by the court in 1973 make criminal codes and other statutes regulating
abortion problematical evidence of policy. But the resistance of legislatures to Roe v. Wade
is apparent, especially for late nontherapeutic abortions.
In consideration of all the above, it is fair to say that late eugenic abortion after amniotic
testing is an activity opposed to state and local policy in a majority of American jurisdictions
including all the populous ones save perhaps New York whose courts nevertheless construe
state policy simultaneously to value life as it tolerates or facilitates eugenic activity.
224. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977); Troppi v. Scarf. 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (197 1); See also Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357.
308 N.W.2d 209 (1981).
In Eisbrenner v. Stanley, parents of a deformed girl sued an obstetrician who allegedly
failed to diagnose German measles in the expectant mother. Plaintiffs alleged wrongful birth
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lematical. The New York Court of Appeals thought the matter so diffi-
cult in one case that it reserved this question for subsequent appeal.225
Even if economic interests within family relationships were pro-
tected by the law of negligence, such damages should not be awarded
in eugenic abortion cases because they are immeasurable. But if dam-
ages are awarded, justice requires that costs be separated 226 into the
cost of care for a perfect infant and special incremental costs of caring
for an imperfect child.
Ironically, the costs of care for a sick infant may be less than the
cost of care for a well infant. Educational and developmental costs are
often lower for an imperfect child with short life expectancy. Where
costs are greater for the child, still the measurement is extremely diffi-
cult. Consider the possible implications. Some parents might claim
that because the possibility of determining sex was not disclosed, they
lost an opportunity to abort a child of an unpreferred sex. Such facts
might be a cause for action to recover damages amounting to the costs
of caring for a girl over a boy. The opposite claim might also be made.
Some say that male children are more disruptive, have more school
problems, tend to get into more trouble and incur greater financial
costs. These factors differ among families and social or economic
strata. The valuation may also differ between urban and rural commu-
nities. The valuation could also vary with prior composition of the
family. Furthermore, what about the extraordinary costs of raising
perfect children? The gifted child aspires to a university education and
graduate school enrollment. Birth of an imperfect child circumvents
these enormous costs. These remunerations over factors and setoffs are
not fanciful. They should be familiar. Economic measurement of eu-
genic damages within the family are so difficult that courts should de-
cline to create a tort actionable by parents respecting inherited
condition of their offspring.
and as damages alleged both costs of care, ordinary and extraordinary, and mental distress.
The trial court allowed plaintiffs to present evidence about all types of damages alleged. But
the jury found for defendant. 106 Mich. App, at 360, 308 N.W.2d at 211. Plaintiffs appealed
asserting arguments of defense counsel and hearsay evidence as error. Defendant cross-ap-
pealed but the opinion does not state what error defendant asserted. Id at 361, 308 N.W.2d
at 211. The appellate court expresses the opinion that the trial judge was correct in allowing
plaintiffs to contest for damages of all the sorts claimed and that the prior case of Troppi v.
carf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), supports allowance of damages for mental
distress offset by any emotional benefits of parenthood. But since the jury had found defend-
ant not guilty of other elements of malpractice, the jury had had no occasion to assess dam-
ages. Id at 367, 308 N.w.2d at 214, Because the appellate court affirmed the verdict and
judgment for defendant, its comments about damages are dicta. And for the reason that the
opinion does not describe the points of error raised by defendant on his cross-appeal, it may
be that damages were not briefed or argued and that the comments about damages are obiter
dicta. Thus, it is still possible to argue in Michigan that emotional benefits reduce financial
damages but that emotional distress does not augment other losses and is not compensable in
a wrongful birth case. Another court struggling with the question of emotional benefits as an
offset to costs of caretaking is the Illinois Appellate Court. See Cochrum v. Baumgartner, 99
Ill. App.3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981).
225. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 413-14, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02.
226. MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE. supra note 159, § 90, at 323.
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The Curious Status of Obstetrical Costs in a Case Alleging Eugenic
Wrongful Birth
Interests Protected The subject is childbirth or parturition. One
court considering unsuccessful therapeutic abortion reasoned that ob-
stetrical costs were not economic damages but a reflection of the
mother's interest in the integrity of her own body. Parturition in that
case was an experience the plaintiff sought to avoid.227 Since the de-
fendant abortionist unsuccessfully undertook to help her avoid that
physical experience, the court reasoned that defendant should pay the
costs closely connected with that experience. In a typical eugenic
wrongful birth case the plaintiffs allege that it was an opportunity for
eugenic abortion or eugenic contraception which they lost when they
did not receive information about eugenic data and tests from the de-
fendant. The implication is manifest. In a case of lost eugenic oppor-
tunity, the woman does not seek to avoid parturition but the particular
infant she delivered.
Nonjusticiabily. When women allege lost opportunities for eu-
genic abortion or eugenic contraception, they do not claim that unde-
sirable childbirth harmed them. Quite the contrary, such an allegation
implies the desire for parturition. Parturition is sometimes sorrowful
and at other times thoroughly ecstatic. 228 Usually, it is a mixture of the
two. The courts are not agencies competent to separate one from the
other. In a eugenic wrongful birth case, the complaint does not allege
violation of a liberty to avoid such an experience. Since a woman will
have sought parturition per se, she cannot claim obstetrical costs inci-
dental to it as damages.
In some wrongful birth cases, a parent has undergone an unsuccess-
ful sterilization or abortion.229 In most eugenic wrongful birth cases, a
parent has done nothing, alleging lost preventative opportunity.
230
Both logic and fairness require that the court offset and credit the ex-
pense of contraception, sterilization or surgery not incurred against the
obstetrical costs in eugenic cases. Other offsets are the costs of tests that
the plaintiffs allege they would have had, costs of screening the hus-
band and wife and amniocentesis testing. Costs of tests and eugenic
abortion may equal or exceed the costs of parturition. Such cases
prompt indeterminable computations of offsets and net amounts.
Courts should avoid such problematical computations especially where
the net will be small or negative. Difficult and protracted litigation
over small net amounts is better avoided to begin with.
227. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 111. App.3d at 60, 391 N.E.2d at 488.
228. Q.H. DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 1, 19, 210 (1945); A. MASLOW, TOWARD A
PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING, 75, 98, 136 (2d ed. 1968).
229. Robertson, Civil LiabilityArising From "Wrongful Birth" Following An Unsuccessful"Steriliza-
tion Operation, 4 A.J.L. & MED. 131 (1978).
230. See notes 8 and 170 supra.
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Causation in a Case Alleging Eugenic Wrongful Birth
The author will now direct attention to elements of causation in
eugenic wrongful birth. The first is causation in fact. In these cases, a
plaintiff makes a literally true allegation that inaction of a defendant
physician caused the loss claimed or that, but for his verbal inaction,
the loss would not have occurred. The reason is that one can allege
reliance on disclosure. But literal reliance by plaintiff in fairness
should not suffice. Reasonable reliance should also be pleaded and
proved. But that too is problematical in a eugenics case.
Reasonable Reliance and Materiality
Hornbook law states that a cause of action for fraud or deceit must
allege a misstatement of material concrete fact and that actual reliance
on that fact by plaintiffs was reasonable. Reasonable reliance and ma-
terial fact are logically distinct elements that practically overlap.23'
Many states borrow these elements from other torts and fasten them to
medical negligence in informed consent cases.232 This limited obliga-
tion of disclosure concerning cure generally follows negligence mod-
els.2 33 These models require proof of a custom of disclosure among
physicians234 and proof of reliance. 235 The plaintiff must plead and
prove that the fact withheld was objectively material making subjective
literal reliance objectively reasonable.236 Materiality is an objective
construct. 237 The calculus of materiality is rather like the calculus re-
viewing courts use in deciding whether to establish new standards and
expand the tort of negligence. 238 How material are the undisclosed
risks to a decision to forego or undertake carrier screening tests or
amniocentesis tests, and how material are particular findings from tests
to a decision to undergo eugenic abortion?
239
Broad demographic facts dealing with this problem are often avail-
able. 24 .Tay-Sachs data illustrate materiality in a concrete setting.
Among Ashkenazim, the probability of carrier status is no more than
one in forty, while the possibility that both spouses are carriers is no
more than one in 1600. Other things equal, low incidence of a risk
tends to imply that its nondisclosure is immaterial. Carrier status
probabilities for other Jewish people are even less.24 ' Yet allegation of
a handicap with larger incidence is still not enough to establish materi-
231. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 173.
232. See Halligan, supra note 39.
233. Id at 35-47.
234. Id at 35-36.
235. Id at 44-47.
236. Id
237. Id at 28-35 and 44-47.
238. Id at 28-33.
239. The use of probabilistic calculus of materiality is classical in jurisprudence as well as in
mathematics. See note 40 supra, at 28-35.
240. See notes 180-90 supra and accompanying text.
241. Courts may take notice of epidemiological data collected by government bureaus and the
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ality because the doctrine is an objective construct implicating public
controversies of a political and nonjusticiable nature also.
To explore the nonjusticiability of materiality in the context of eu-
genic wrongful birth cases, suppose an express allegation of risk, inci-
dence, nondisclosure, materiality and reliance. Should a court
undertake a public opinion poll of the Ashkenazim population and per-
sons with Ashkenazim blood, or should it poll the public at large? By
reference to what values and hypothetical reasonable persons shall a
jury deliberate on the objective importance of an undisclosed risk?
Where the underlying factual matter is eugenics, the objective rele-
vance and materiality are more than usually controversial. Such mat-
ters are delicate and infrequently discussed. A random sample of
twelve persons sitting as a jury is not likely to hold a representative
cross-section of community values in such cases. Nor will a small col-
lection of persons be able to ascertain eugenic consensus of the commu-
nity from life experience. Eugenic materiality, like eugenic standards,
is not justiciable by common law courts. The courts should decline to
entertain such claims.
The alternative would be to exclude proof of materiality as an ele-
ment of the tort. That alternative has little to recommend it. Reliance
should always be tested against an objective standard before serving as
a basis for judicial relief. Actual subjective reliance is the literal cause
in fact alleged. It should not suffice for plaintiffs to allege only subjec-
tive reliance consisting in a hypothetical decision they claim they
would have made. When the gist of the claim is nondisclosure, the law
requires allegation and proof of objective materiality of the fact not
disclosed. But when a parent attempts to prove materiality in a eugenic
wrongful birth case, that parent unavoidably alleges a consensus of
political opinion among citizens that does not exist.242 In such cases,
materiality is a nonjusticiable construct.
The citizen who deems facts important may obtain them by self
study or contract with a eugenic counsellor.243 That person has the
right to such information if the counsellor contracts to disclose the re-
quested facts. In that case, nondisclosure of information is a basis for
breach of express contract.2" There, objective materiality of fact and
other elements of a delictual action are not involved. Rejection of eu-
genic torts does not suppress information or frustrate persons who want
leading private scientific sources whose work is used and scrutinized by governmental agen-
cies and others. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 331 (2d ed., 1972).
242. That is to say, eugenic risks are unlike collateral risks of treatment or side effects, and con-
sensus about eugenic risks is less likely so that the whole concept of objective materiality
somewhat breaks down.
243. A paper exploring breach of warranty and other contractual theories is Robertson, Ciril Lia-
bility Arising From "Wrongful Birth" Following An Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4
A.J.L. & MED. 131 at 134-37. See Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 51, 391 N.E.2d 479,
488-89, for a discussion of the requirements of separate consideration and explicitness in a
claim of breach of medical warranty.
244. The measure of damages and public policy will still be difficult issues.
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the information. People are free to see educators and ask questions.
Opportunities foreseeably lost on account of breach of contract may
often be claimed as consequential damages. 245 But to be actionable, a
lost opportunity must be an opportunity to do a lawful act.246
Legal Availability of Eugenic Abortion
Since contraception is widely privileged,247 the discussion of legality
will concentrate on abortion. The author will again use Tay-Sachs dis-
ease as an example. Amniocentesis tests to detect the disease cannot
commence before sixteen to eighteen weeks after conception because
there is not sufficient fluid from which to draw a test sample before that
time.248 Then the fluid is analyzed. The procedure involves isolation
of chromosomes (Karyo-typing), culturing for long periods, and analy-
sis of enzymes released. The whole process takes a minimum of forty
days.249  Even when the tests go well, the process brings the woman
perilously close to the end of the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy after
which eugenic abortion is not available in many states. 25" Though dur-
ing this period the states must allow therapeutic abortion, only about
fourteen permit eugenic abortion. 5 While some plaintiffs may claim
they would have gone elsewhere, many are the exigencies of locating
and going to a facility where legal abortion is available. In such cir-
cumstances, the law should require plaintiffs to allege availability with
great particularity. Unless they do, the allegation of cause in fact is not
sufficient. Even if parents allege an absolute right to abortion, this is so
dubious as to be demurrable without particulars.
Recognition of eugenic wrongful birth will create an incentive for
245. Query, when a plaintiff sues a counsellor for breach of a counselling contract and as conse-
quences of breach alleges loss of an opportunity to prevent conception of an ill child or to
abort him or her, does she seek to protect her reliance interest or expectation interest in
performance? Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J.
52. 373 (1936); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329. Opportunities or choices lost in this
sense are not like chances, or prize contests where the gain is aleatory. RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS. § 332. Such alternative measures of damages are not required because when
plaintiff parents have elected to procreate, now have a sick child, and credibly testify that
they would have elected without doubt not to procreate had they had correct information,
then consequences in the form of increased costs appear reasonably certain as required by
the law of contracts, I I WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1344A, 1346 (3d. ed., 1968), though
measurement of benefits conferred, a familiar part of the computation of contractual dam-
ages. remains difficult. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 329, 331(l). All these difficulties of
classification demonstrate that costs of child care should not be considered general damages
for breach of contract but special damages recoverable only when a defendant contractor
bargains to pay them either expressly or by implication from notice received and specialized
activity. That is why we limit our discussion to genetic counsellors and argue against liabil-
ity of health care providers who do not concentrate on genetic counselling.
246. That the opportunity lost must be the opportunity to do a lawful act is readily derived from
the principle that a contract is unenforceable if performance be criminal, tortious, or other-
wise against state policy. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512.
247. Griswald v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
248. Hirshhorn. Human Genetics, 224 J.A.M.A. 597, 604 (1973).
249. GlautzAmniocentesis, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 29 (G. Annas & A. Milunsky, eds., 1976).
250. E.g.. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 81 (1979); See note 223 supra.
251. See note 223 supra.
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physicians to provide information which may operate as a suggestion to
obtain an illegal abortion. When patients are unable to travel to an-
other jurisdiction permiting eugenic abortion after the twenty-fourth
week of pregnancy, the suggestion amounts to a private law obligation
to tempt commission of a crime. In many other cases, law abiding citi-
zens will not obtain an illegal abortion rendering the testing for naught.
In these cases, nondisclosure of risk will not cause lost opportunity but
will increase medical costs to patients and society.
Proximate Causation
The Indirect Nature of the Consequences of Nondisclosure
Though plaintiffs in eugenic wrongful birth cases allege that they
would have undergone tests and procured an abortion, the likelihood
of such behavior is questionable. Parental deliberation intermediates
any effect of the physician's nondisclosure as an intervening cause. No
physician produces inheritable illnesses. Courts should not render
judgments against defendants who have not disclosed facts as if they
produced the ill condition of a baby or failed to cure it. To treat de-
fendants guilty of verbal nonfeasance like defendants in a prenatal im-
pact case is to expand the tort of negligence beyond fair and
manageable boundaries.252
Foreseeability
Foreseeability in law is constructed of predictability and fairness in
a particular setting.2 53 The concrete example of Tay-Sachs disease
serves well to illustrate the role of foreseeability in eugenic wrongful
birth.
The objective likelihood that a child born of parents who are pure
Ashkenazim will suffer Tay-Sachs disease is one in 6,400. This low
level of likelihood is the objective aspect of predictability. The subjec-
tive aspect is the likelihood that a person, undertaking to treat women
obstetrically, will contemplate liability for child support of imperfect
children and mental distress of their parents. Such animadvertence is
not likely and should dissuade courts from creating eugenic wrongful
birth torts.
Contemplation of the liability illustrates the disproportionality to
the asserted fault. Disproportionality is the rationale of Howard v.
Lecher25 4 denying liability for mental distress. The same rationale
somewhat motivates the courts that decided Berman v. Allan 25 5 and
252. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, IlI, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65-66. 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1977).
253. True probability, cause and effect and a desire for a fair scope of liability are the ingredients
of proximate cause. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 42, at 244.
254. 42 N.Y.2d at I1I, 366 N.E.2d at 65-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
255. See note 16 supra.
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Wilczynski.256 The comments are germane to the whole notion of eu-
genic wrongful birth. One of the attributes of good jurisprudence is a
doctrinal means to keep liability within fair and manageable bounda-
ries. 2 57 Proximate cause is such a means, and it ought to be invoked
here.
Summary to Part Two
The courts should not recognize a new tort of eugenic Wrongful
birth just as they should not recognize the tort of eugenic wrongful life.
Nor should mental equanimity and economic expectations be interests
protected by the tort of negligence so as to create a potentially huge
liability for mere verbal nonfeasance. Creation of such a tort would set
the courts adrift on a sea of nonjusticiable contentions about the mate-
riality of eugenic facts, the standards for their disclosure, and the
amount of damages. Finally, the courts should reject the tort because
its creation will work social harm, not good.
PART THREE: LEGISLATION
A major theme played here has been legislative prerogative. What
can be said of a proposal that the legislature excuse pleading and proof
of some elements of negligence in eugenic wrongful life or wrongful
birth? This suggests that the new torts are similar to negligence and
that enactment of the new torts is not radical. All the foregoing discus-
sion shows that this is not so. Both torts lack several elements of negli-
gence. Either new tort would be a new composition in a new key and
no mere variation on older themes. It would do violence to legal usage
to term either new tort an adjustment or rearrangement of negligence
or malpractice.2 18 If such a bill were introduced, how should such a
bill be titled or styled?
The tort closest to those proposed is negligent misrepresentation,259
an outgrowth of deceit derived from trespass.26 ° Yet even deceit and
misrepresentation differ from eugenic wrongful life and wrongful birth.
Deceit and misrepresentation rarely compel affirmative action 261 to dis-
close data and both require proof of other elements 262 problematical in
eugenic wrongful life and wrongful birth cases. An obligation of the
sort called a middle ground 263 in an earlier discussion of duty resem-
256. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App.3d at 62, 391 N.E.2d at 487.
257. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d at 111, 366 N.E.2d at 65-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
258. 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 18.09 (4th ed.) (relation of
title to the body of an act).
259. See PROSSER, Supra note 10, § 107, at 704-10.
260. See PROSSER, supra note 10, at 731; F. MAITLAND, FoRMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 44,
54 (A. Chaytor & W. Whittaker, eds., 1971).
261. See PROSSER, supra note 10, § 106, at 694-99.
262. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7 (1956); Halligan, supra note 174, at 25-35;
PROSSER, supra note 10, at 685-86, 705-10.
263. See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
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bles an obligation defined by common law deceit more than it resem-
bles negligence. A right correlative with such an obligation would
imply a limited form of suit alleging eugenic wrongful birth. Statutory
creation of such an obligation to give honest answers to direct questions
or to refer patients who ask them to other good sources would not do
huge violence to the established law of torts. But allowing claims for
wrongful life alleged as a consequence of a breach of this moderate
obligation would still contradict policy264 in most jurisdictions to value
life and would present doubt about the reality of harm suffered by the
infant. Indeed, some sorts of eugenic wrongful life torts may so'conflict
with constitutional rights of parents that a legislature may not create
them in any form.
A legislature might consider defining a narrow obligation of disclo-
sure and a correlative right in parents drawing upon the law of deceit
without huge disorganization of tort law doctrine. The critical question
is how the legislature should do it.
While the lawmaker must answer this question,265 the costs of eu-
genic disclosure and testing are many and the benefits few and small.
266
The contrariety of other policies may be great. Precision of legislative
titles does not remove conflict of values and does not dissolve costs and
inflate benefits. Any bill should contain all the relevant adjustments to
other statutes with appropriations for public health and public educa-
tion which new eugenic activity will require.267 Hearings on any such
bill should be protracted and well advertised. All factions should be
heard. Effects on the volume of litigation should be estimated and
budgeted. Any decision to legislate a eugenic obligation should take
care to enact that no other like obligation exists. 268 Any assembly cre-
ating such an obligation must then deliberate on sanctions. Questions
of remedies contain burning issues of policy and must not be left to the
courts. Elected representatives owe their constituents deliberation on
these issues. One fair remedial authorization would be a right of par-
ents to recover extraordinary costs of care incurred during the minority
of the child discounted to present value and mitigated by any benefit.
The disfavored status 269 of mental equanimity should persuade legisla-
264. See notes 46-62 supra and accompanying text.
265. See notes 189-194 supra and accompanying text.
266. See notes 180-188 supra and accompanying text.
267. See notes 184-188, 191, 192 supra and accompanying text.
268. The canon of narrow construction of a statute in derogation of common law lingers and
makes it wise for a legislature to express its intent to pre-empt an area and to define the only
remedies. 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 258, § 61.01, at 41, nn. 3, 4. Also, penal provisions
should be treated separately since they too are construed differently from other enactments.
Id. at § 60.01 (Liberal Construction of Remedial Legislation).
269. The courts have entertained even intentional interference only lately and reluctantly, fearing
fictitious and trivial claims, noting difficulties of measurement, and reflecting upon the un-
foreseeable nature of many emotional responses of plaintiffs. PROSSER, supra note 10, at
§ 12. Negligent infliction is actionable only when it accompanies bodily harm and a few
jurisdictions may still even require an accompanying impact against the body of plaintiff by
defendant or his instrument. Id., § 54, at 326-35.
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tors to disallow recovery for parental emotional harm.
Most important is delineation of the risks that must be disclosed so
that the courts need not draw artificial lines or grade lives and illnesses
to determine materiality of nondisclosure. The legislature must deter-
mine when a technical disease is an illness, when an illness is material,
and when racial predilection is material. One technique posits delega-
tion of such definitions to the state public health department. 270 Those
should include prevalence and incidence statistics, existence of parental
screening tests, existence of fetal tests, and racial predilections which
the doctor must disclose to questioning patients. Good legislation will
immunize physicians from parental suits by patients who become
frightened reading the list or who claim waste of money procuring neg-
ative tests.
Legislatures should take care to express their intent on all points of
private controversy identified by nondisclosure litigation lest the bill
create ambiguity rather than settle doubt. Legislators should prepare a
detailed report for circulation to all interested parties referring to all
issues litigated previously.
The appendix provides an outline of section headings for a statute.
Beside each heading appears a list of issues which legislation should
settle and include in that section. The same outline also serves as a
table of contents for committee and sponsor reports. Use of the list
assures that the legislature will deliberate simultaneously on all rele-
vant issues before passage of a new statute.
A conscientious legislature may conclude upon full deliberation
that the best statute will be one which excuses any physician other than
a genetic counsellor or private health educator from any obligation of
disclosure. That is, a statute granting immunity may be the best law.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Absent statutes authorizing suit, courts should routinely dismiss
complaints alleging life, even diseugenic life, as a wrong. Life is not a
harm cognizable at common law. Standards should be legislated posi-
tively by political representatives of all factions where widespread non-
partisan consensus does not exist. Absent legislation, even causal
elements are problematical. In all events, costs of eugenic wrongful life
exceed benefits even when the computation derives from favorable eth-
ical assumptions. Racial stigmatization, disharmony in the family, and
increased expense of medical care are key among costs that must be
acknowledged even on neutral principles.
Rejection of the tort of eugenic wrongful life implies rejection of
eugenic wrongful birth as well because parental claims for cost and
inconvenience of care for sick minors are derivative. Eugenic wrongful
birth complaints share many of the elemental infirmities of eugenic
270. Halligan, supra note 174, at 262, 270.
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wrongful life and a tort of eugenic wrongful birth modeled on negli-
gence will generate most of the private and social costs of the compan-
ion tort. Creation of a tort of eugenic wrongful birth unfairly expands
negligence to protect novel interests.
Either tort implies that the medical profession will suffer exposure
to enormous liability for mere nonfeasance on account of events only
tenuously influenced by the nonfeasance. The torts leave little room
for silence dictated by conscience and create conflicts of loyalty toward
patients.
With one exception,27 1 the legislature may create a variety of causes
of action for nondisclosure of eugenic information. But this paper il-
lustrates that the legislature should not create a tort of eugenic wrong-
ful life and that any tort of eugenic wrongful birth should be very
limited. The legislation should not obligate any defendant to do any-
thing he has not specifically contracted to do272 save to give honest an-
swers to questions put to him or, in the alternative, to direct inquiring
patients to other sources.
271. See notes 153 & 154 supra.





An Outline of Section Headings of a Statute to Govern Disclosure
of Eugenic Information with Suggestions of Issues to be Legislated
under Each.
Findings
Testing and Information. How Much. Enough or Not Enough. Accu-
racy of Information. Persons or Segments Dissatisfied.
Policy
Life. Health. Reproductive Choice. Freedom of Conscience and
Speech. Occupational Choice. Specialization of Labor. Efficient Allo-
cation of Resources. Consumer Wellbeing. Freedom of Contract. Ju-
dicial Resources. Public Welfare Costs. Public Education. Population
Eugenics.
Intent and Construction
Interests Protected and Not Protected in General. Remedial or Restric-
tive Intent. Liberal or Strict Construction. Effectuation of Purpose.
Severance or Not of Invalid Parts. Classes of Affected Persons in Gen-
eral. Public Regulation of Relationships. Other Private Law
Implications.
Persons Regulated
Persons. Agencies. Practitioners. Relationships. Genetic Counsellors.
Health Care Providers. Health Advocates.
Persons Entitled.
Parents. Children. Siblings. Relatives. Third Persons. Promisees.
Patients. Pupils. The Public.
Transactions Regulated
Information. Critical Information. Incidental Information. Disclo-
sure. Nondisclosure. Affirmative Action. Treatment. Counselling.
Publication. Advocacy. Propaganda.
Materiality
Conditions. Severity. Incidence. Prevalence. Racial Predilections.
Objective-Subjective Distinctions. Relation to Reliance.
Delegation
Definition of Material Risks by Public Health Department. Lists. Ex-




Schools. Publishers. Hospitals. Charities. Planned Parenthood Orga-
nizations. Relatives. Parents. Clergy. Government Agencies. Munic-
ipal Clinics. Conditional Immunity for Conscience. Exculpation by
Referral.
Exclusivity
Other Rights to or Expectations of Eugenic Information. Remedies for
Violation Exclusive or Not. Pre-emptive Intent. Local Rules.
Obligations
Performance of Contract. Warranties. Affirmative Action Absent
Contract. Accuracy. Honesty. Use of Delictual Forms as Guiding
Models. Deceit. Negligence. Malpractice. Sources of Standards. De-
gree or Level of Care or Skill. Differences Among Classes of Persons:
Genetic Counsellors vs. Health Care Providers, etc.
Correlative Rights
Interests and Rights of Patients, Pupils, Persons Counselled, Subscrib-
ers, Promissees. Extent and Measure of Rights Generally.
Damages
Restitution of Consideration. Economic Consequences. Emotional
Consequences. Ceilings on Damages. Interest. Costs. Exemplary
Damages. Fixed Rates. Penalties. Distinctions among Categories of
Defendants and Relationships Implicated. Reference to Theory or
Wrong Alleged. Cumulative Recovery. Combining Contractual and
Non-contractual Claims. Credits for Recovery by Others. Protected
Interests Reflected. Norms or Standards of Comparison. Other Tech-
niques to Assess Damages. Lump Sums and Installments. Public Wel-
fare Liens or Awards. Protecting Minors. Enforcing Use of Awards
For Support of Minors. Contractual Exculpation or Limitation.
Other Elements
Reliance. Reasonableness of Reliance. Corpus Delicti: Jeopardy (At
Risk) or Materialization of Eugenic Disease. Mode of Erroneous Dis-
closure or Other Breach or Violation. Actual Ignorance, Other Sources
of Data. Reality of Alleged Opportunity. Legality of Opportunity.
Limitations
Occurrence. Discovery of Harm. Discovery of Wrong. Writings.




Disclaimer. Parental Immunity. Other Immunities. Waiver. Release.
Tribunals
Courts. Administrative Agencies. Arbitration. Judicial Review. Law.
Facts.
Evidence
Hearsay. Epidemiological Data. Surveys Re Standards. Demographic




Public School Curricular Mandates. Public Health Agency. Screening
Programs: Voluntary, Involuntary. Licensing Genetic Counsellors.
Discipline of Regulated Persons.
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